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When we consider who we are, we would certainly include a
sense of caring as part of the self-portrait.1 But just what would
we mean by this aspirational characterization? What does it mean
to care? About whom should we care? What metric permits us to
care about some entities more than others? How would we utilize
whatever caring we can muster? What role can law, specifically
statutes protecting endangered species, play in moving us toward
a more caring self?
This Article addresses these questions by analogy. In short, this
Article argues that we know we must take care of children.2 Any
* Nancy Kubasek, Esq. is a Professor of Legal Studies at Bowling
Green State University. She is the author of three books including ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAw (3d ed., Prentice Hall, 1990), and also the author of
over fifty articles pertaining to environmental law. Professor Kubasek's
co-author is M. Neil Browne, Distinguished Teaching Professor of Eco-
nomics at Bowling Green State University and author of several books
and articles on environmental law issues. Michael D. Meuti is a re-
search assistant for Professors Kubasek and Browne.
1. See AMITAI ETzIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TowARD A NEW Eco-
NOMICS 1-13 (1988) for a discussion of the stunted version of our hu-
manity that results from seeing ourselves as altogether egoistic.
2. See CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 5 (1997)
where he spells out the egoistic view of social welfare as overly "flat".
In other words, we care about things, not just in amounts, but in in-
commensurable fashions. Children, for example, are not to be com-
pared to so many cars or vegetables. They are a unique category unto
themselves, and we can tell we feel that way by our reactions to the vul-
nerability of children. We are not the kind of people who would walk
away from a child lost in a mall without first assuring ourselves that
help was nigh.
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other kind of behavior on our part would demean our under-
standing of what kind of people we are. While endangered spe-
cies are distinct from children in that they lack our particular bi-
ological heritage, they are at the same time similar in numerous
significant fashions. Those similarities create group responsibili-
ties akin to those we feel so naturally in our relationship to chil-
dren. The vulnerability of both children and endangered species
activates our empathy.3
If this argument has merit, appropriate policy can be guided
by reliance on market forces or political expressions of collective
responsibility.4 These two processes provide the contending vo-
cabularies and capabilities by which we debate allocative and dis-
tributional questions. They serve as the contending conflict reso-
lution mechanisms - mechanisms that those wishing to protect
or modify the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), as well as other
legislative disputants, see as comparatively blessed or flawed.
In the policy realm, this Article has two related objectives.
First, we want to argue that political voices must be dominant be-
cause they represent us at our most caring moments, and protec-
tion of endangered species is tough moral work that calls for a
community response. Second, we wish to militate against any po-
tential misunderstanding of the first point by debunking the idea
that partisans of markets and politics respectively must hunker
down in their respective bunkers lobbing grenades at one an-
other whenever tough allocative decisions must be made. While
the political and market spheres are certainly separate in impor-
tant regards, the potential for their partnership in environmental
law is immense, once we appreciate the necessary preeminence of polit-
ics. Forging those effective partnerships in the interest of a more
sustainable future first requires society to appreciate the strength
3. See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, STACKED DECK A STORY OF SELFISH-
NESS IN AMERICA 29-51 (1997) for an argument that justice compels us
to take action in response to these shared vulnerabilities. To turn our
back on entities that are weak is both self-defeating and unfair. We rec-
ognize our own vulnerabilities and as a result feel a sense of responsi-
bility when we see vulnerabilities become actual threats.
4. Any introductory economics book begins its narrative of eco-
nomic behavior by identifying the scope of human needs and then
contrasting the outcomes of market and political processes. See, e.g.,
BRADLEY R. SCHILLER, THE MICRO ECONOMY TODAY 3-6 (1997); KARL E.
CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 37-8 (1999).
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of individualism as a cultural force and resist the very idea that
collective responsibility is a value we should revere.
In Section I, this Article establishes the strength of individual-
ism as a guide to understanding American attitudes toward the
optimal scope of politics and thus law. The statutory impact of
this romance with individualism is an emphasis on avoiding law
where possible so that society can experience the alleged benefits
of market resolutions to our problems.5 Section II explains the
overlapping responsibilities of markets and politics, and contends
that the two must work in tandem to avoid the futile ideological
struggles that we have witnessed year after year as the Endan-
gered Species Act fails to be modified due to market and politi-
cal voices apparently vetoing the objectives of the other. Section
III explains how environmentalists can use the very individualis-
tic market arguments that they are so accustomed to opposing to
fulfill their own agendas. Having provided the reader with an ad-
equate background, Section IV then makes explicit the impor-
tance of the analogy between children and endangered species.
The next two components of the Article explain the current stat-
utory mechanism for protecting endangered species and analyzes
the primary alternative proposals for reforming the ESA. The fi-
nal Section discusses the debate between proponents of each
view in terms of the analogy. Based on that analysis, the authors
prescribe a resolution for the debate over the reauthorization of
the ESA.
I. INDIVIDUALISM AND MARKETS: MAKING DECISIONS AS IF A VILLAGE
IS ONLY AN AGGREGATION OF EGOS
The pervasiveness of individualism makes it difficult for Ameri-
cans to see.6 It results in the elevation of the individual's interests
5. See JOHN H. MCMANus, MARKET-DRIVEN JOURNALISM: LET THE CITI-
ZEN BEWARE? 4-5 (1994) for a clear enumeration of what markets are
presumed to accomplish when they are functioning in an optimal
context.
6. See generally INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE
(Robert N. Bellah et al. eds., 1987). Individualism is a fundamental be-
lief of those with an atomistic view of human nature. Specifically, it
holds that each individual is the controlling factor, through his or her
choices, in shaping personal outcomes. Personal responsibility is both
the prescription and description for human behavior.
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over those of the collective. The result is a cultural7 habit of
mind that views personal needs as preeminent and social needs
as secondary.8 Individualists downplay their ties to others, seeing
themselves as essentially atomistic.9 Consequently, individualism
holds that "each individual is the controlling factor in shaping
personal destiny." 0 This perception of reality leads to the valuing
of self-reliance, freedom from regulation (negative liberty)," ra-
7. Culture is implicit in the expectations and judgments of par-
ticipants. HARRY C. TRIANDIS, INDIVIDUALISM & COLLECTIVISM 4 (1995) of-
fers the following useful definition of its source and power:
Culture emerges in interaction. As people interact, some of
their ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving are transmitted
to each other and become automatic ways of reacting to spe-
cific situations. The shared beliefs, attitudes, norms, roles,
and behaviors are aspects of culture .... Culture is to society
what memory is to individuals. It includes things that have
'worked' in the past.
8. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY
(1962) for a discussion of what he calls social imbalance, the immer-
sion in private lavishness in the midst of social squalor. His point is
that absorption with individual preferences and their fulfillment in
markets establishes a quite understandable fascination with the fulfill-
ment of certain kinds of needs. For purposes of our argument, that
neither children nor endangered species are either owned or permit-
ted to be commodities suggests an awareness that there is something
more than individual valuation at work in designing the parameters of
politics.
9. Atomism assumes that the makeup of the individual is given in-
dependently from society. It "postulates independent disembodied enti-
ties volitionally charting their own paths in pursuit of personal well-
being." Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, et al., Advancing the Rights of Poor and
Working-Class Women in an Individualistic Culture, 2 LOYOLA POVERTY L. J.
41, n.2 (1996). Holding that the only purpose of society is to benefit
the individual, atomism places a high value on negative liberty (the ab-
sence of government interference in the lives of its citizens). Atomistic
psychology had a strong influence on the development of classical lib-
eral thought. E.K HUNT, PROPERTY AND PROPHETS: THE EVOLUTION OF EC-
ONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND IDEAS (7th ed.) 39-40 (1995). This influence
remains evident in the market-oriented thought of neoclassical econo-
mists today.
10. Giampetro-Meyer, et al., supra note 9, at 42, n.3.
11. ROBERT N. BELLAH, ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 23 (1985). Bellah notes that "Free-
[Vol. X
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
tionality, 12 and personal choice.
A community from this perspective is an aggregation of egos.
Social wisdom emerges from the nurturing of the virtues associ-
ated with the individualistic worldview. To speak of a community
as an organic endeavor is, from this perspective, confusing.
Hence, language of unification and communal responsibility
such as claims that it takes a whole village to accomplish a goal is
seen as misguided because it detracts from personal responsibil-
ity and thereby weakens social character.
Alexis de Tocqueville was among the first scholars to label
such thought patterns as "individualism." In Democracy in America,
he wrote:
'Individualism' is a word recently coined to express a new idea.
Our fathers knew only about egoism. Egoism is a passionate
and exaggerated love of self which leads a man to think of all
things in terms of himself and to prefer himself to all. Individu-
alism is a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citi-
zen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw
into the circle of family and friends; with this little society
formed to his taste, he gladly leaves the greater society to look
after itself. Egoism springs from a blind instinct; individualism
is based on misguided judgment rather than depraved feeling.
It is due more to inadequate understanding than to perversity
of heart. Egoism sterilizes the seeds of every virtue; individual-
ism at first only dams the spring of public virtues, but in the
long run it attacks and destroys all the others too and finally
merges in egoism. Egoism is a vice as old as the world. It is not
peculiar to one form of society more than another. Individual-
ism is of democratic origin and threatens to grow as conditions
get more equal. 13
The United States that Tocqueville analyzed almost two centu-
ries ago is today the primary site where individualistic thought
dom is perhaps the most resonant, deeply held American value." Id. To
Americans, freedom is often defined as the freedom from an oppres-
sive authority and from having others' views and lifestyles forced upon
them. However, "[w]hat it is that one might do with that freedom is
much more difficult for Americans to define." Id.
12. Id. at 144; Bellah also discusses middle class individualism and
its emphasis on rationality and success. Id. at 149.
13. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, excerpted in INDIVIDU-
ALISM & COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 11 (eds. Robert N. Bellah, et
al.) (1987).
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flourishes.' 4 Evidence of individualism's strength in the United
States includes its reliance on a market-driven economy, 5 its
dominant form of religion, 6 and its emphasis on human rights.
The link between individualism and markets is especially im-
portant for thinking about endangered species because their sur-
vival must be negotiated in an individualistic setting. Markets of-
fer private pleasure that is threatened by democratic political
judgments and the statutes they encourage. In that regard, mar-
kets are the venue in which the fruits of personal responsibility
can be rewarded. But endangered species are everyone's con-
cern, and as such lack value in a domain that responds to per-
sonal preferences only. Hence, those who wish to protect endan-
gered species look expectantly to political discourse as their best
chance to activate their priorities.
Contrary to individualistic thought, communitarianism or any
form of political activity that elevates the needs of the collective
above the needs of the individual recognizes the need for a sepa-
rate sphere of activities delimited by their joint preference and
consumption.' 7 Collectivists frequently define their well being in
terms of the group's well being. Rather than emphasize individ-
ual rights, as individualists do, collectivists view their duties to
the group as paramount. They value interdependence and close
relationships. I8 Because collectivists tend to see themselves as in-
terconnected with other members of their society, they are more
likely to implement economic policies that rely on forces other
than supply and demand.
As a consequence, a certain tension exists between democracy
and markets. 9 The tension is especially pronounced for those
14. George C. Lodge, Introduction: Ideology and Country Analysis, in
IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: AN ANALYSIS OF NINE COUN-
TRIES 10 (George C. Lodge & Ezra F. Vogel eds., 1987).
15. See E.K HUNT, supra note 9 at 38-45 for a discussion of the in-
dividualistic assumptions and attitudes that encouraged the develop-
ment of a market culture.
16. GERRY C. HEARD, BASIC VALUES AND ETHICAL DECISIONS: AN Ex-
AMINATION OF INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMUNITY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 5
(1990). Heard views American religious individualism as being closely
related to the Protestantism that is dominant in the United States.
17. See generally, LODGE, supra note 14.
18. TRIANDIS, supra note 7, at 44.
19. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 163-
67 (1993); S. L. HURLEY, NATURAL REASONS: PERSONALITY AND POLITY
[Vol. X
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
who believe that at times humans make decisions from a non-
egoistic framework. 20 Environmentalists see markets as advancing
private consumption at the expense of social needs and feel a
consequent affinity for the use of democracy to construct envi-
ronmentally friendly statutes.
II. OVERLAPPING SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY. POLITICS AND
MARKETS
The general regulatory background is shaped by a struggle
among loyalists between one or another approach to allocate re-
sources, resulting from the tension between politics and markets.
For many reasons, both substantive and symbolic, markets are el-
evated by some and reviled by others as the preferred conflict
resolution mechanism. Mavens of markets see the profit motive
as a wondrously smooth, efficient avenue for achieving social wel-
fare. Those distrustful of markets recall the market's putative
role in encouraging soil erosion, unsafe products, and destruc-
tion of the rainforest and are immediately skeptical of market re-
sponses to human dilemmas.2 '
Some market advocates propose protecting endangered species
by encouraging the development of private farms where owners
protect property interests and preserve endangered species all in
one. For example, increasing the size of the tiger population
would go hand in hand with the owners' objectives to turn
healthy profits by selling the rights to hunt the tigers. Advocates
say all this would happen without any of the affronts to liberty
associated with political "intervention" into private activity.
To appreciate the intensity of the visceral rejection of such a
proposal requires an exploration of the relationship between
personal choice and social responsibilities. One of the most func-
tional of economic concepts is opportunity costs. If we conceive
of human existence as one haunted by resources inadequate to
fulfill our material desires, all choices we make entail a price: to
(1989).
20. See, e.g., supra notes 1 & 2.
21. See, e.g., JOSHUA KARLINER, THE CORPORATE PLANET (1997), for
an illustration of how market decision making, when taken to ex-
tremes, will result in sacrificing the environmental well being of the
community for private profit.
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get X, we must lose something else.22 From this dismal perspec-
tive, we are sent looking for decision-making frameworks that
promise tolerable resolutions to the discord stimulated by diver-
gent views of optimal choice.
From these frameworks we require a certain amount of fair-
ness, dependability, efficiency, and respect for liberty. In addi-
tion, they must be capable of coordinating the views of a huge
magnitude of relevant parties. In the end, we are left with two
candidates, neither of which is altogether satisfactory-markets
and politics. Our tendency to dichotomize, encourages us to see
the two institutional frameworks as oppositional, thereby stimu-
lating a tension already present by virtue of the relative per-
ceived benefits of each to particular constituencies. To what ex-
tent are the two spheres justifiably separable? To what extent are
they partners persistently jockeying for domination?
In general, what are the attributes of a human problem that
nestle comfortably in the market realm? This question has a con-
fused quality to it in our culture. The allocation and distribution
of all material goods and services are simply presumed to be
market responsibilities in our culture unless someone can
demonstrate the contrary.23 The burden of proof is therefore on
those who would urge limits on market choices. Markets appear
to maximize personal freedom, especially if we do not look too
deeply into more positive forms of liberty, many of which are
represented by capabilities that require monetary resources. For
instance, a tiger farm in India is not a relevant vacation site for
an animal lover who, while possessing the legal right to travel
there, lacks the income and wealth to finance the use of that
particular market opportunity.
Fundamentally, market choices by both buyers and sellers are
consistent with a worldview dominated by individualism. Suppose
that the major determinant of our condition in life is the conge-
ries of choices we make. These choices have outcomes that are
deserved because we are presumed to make them as reflective
calculators aware of our objectives and cognizant of both the
identity and ramifications of relevant options. It would seem to
22. See CASE & FAIR, supra note 4, at 26-30.
23. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 2.
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follow that we should presume the aptness of markets, that deci-
sion-making framework that permits us, as individuals, to act on
personal preferences. Pari passu, the community's preferences
will be fulfilled to an extent in certain institutional arrange-
ments. What results is a private sphere, a domain where goods
and services are bought and sold in an optimal fashion.
Yet, even the most vigorous market romance is limited by the
realization that at times the presumption on behalf of markets
can be overcome. For instance, we would be jarred to see a shop
in a strip mall urging us to avail ourselves of the current sale on
"friendship." 24 But why are certain dimensions of the human ex-
perience regarded as forbidden exchanges? What happened to
the dominant rhetoric about freedom of contract in such situa-
tions? What are the parameters of the public sphere?
Although economics textbooks are generally market-oriented
teaching tools, 25 all of them have a relatively tiny section labeled
"market failure. ' 26 In these sections, the bases for democratic
correction of market decisions are at least mentioned. Externali-
ties, asymmetric information, unfair initial distributions of assets,
monopoly power, the conflict between social and individual ra-
tionality, and free rider problems are mentioned. These few
24. See M. Neil Browne & Laurie Blank, The Contrast between Friend-
ship and Business-Consumer Relationships: Trust is an Earned Attribute, 16
Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. (1997) for an explanation of one distinguishing
characteristic between market and non-market expectations. Any mar-
ket has a struggle for information shaping the terms of the trade. Ordi-
narily, the seller by dint of greater practice and familiarity with the
product or service possesses knowledge about the object for sale that
the buyer would prefer to have as well. In friendships the information
flow would be uninterrupted by egoistic calculations. Those same calcu-
lations are not only the currency of the market, but the mandate.
25. See David George, The Rhetoric of Economic Texts, 24 J. ECON. Is-
SUES 861 (1990).
26. See, e.g., CASE & FAIR supra note 4, at 297-300. This attenuated
discussion of the institutional limitations of the market narrative that
shapes the entirety of all mainstream economics texts is quite typical.
Instances where markets will surely not provide the allocative and dis-
tributional benefits touted explicitly and implicitly throughout the text
are defined and illustrated, while being ensconced safely in the midst
of some several hundreds of conflicting pages.
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pages provide the substance of political discourse.27
But something is very wrong about the antagonistic stance be-
tween markets and politics. Indeed, no one is opposed to state
intervention; the struggle is about when and how.28 Free markets
depend on an array of statutory prohibitions, many of which are
highly coercive; the laws of property are an example.29 No wage
or price is simply a market price. Each results, in part, from the
framework provided by a number of governmental guarantees.
Thus, even the most devoted market partisan is voicing not so
much an absolute preference as a presumption. They would pre-
fer markets to solve problems, but must acknowledge that the
struggle is really for whether markets or politics set the domi-
nant tone and standards for allocative and distributional choices.
It is from this framework of shared spheres of responsibility
that the battle surrounding ESA should be recast. The ideologi-
cal urges could be moderated in the sense that the sides repre-
sented in the debate are less remote than is ordinarily assumed.
The question remains whether environmentalists will be able to
view markets as potentially instrumental for meeting their objec-
tives. The next section outlines several avenues for meeting mar-
ket advocates halfway.
III. THE POTENTIAL COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN ECONOMISTS AND
ENVIRONMENTALISTS
As the primary intellectual spokespersons for the merits of
market decisions, economists serve as a bete noir for many envi-
ronmentalists. Recent comments made about economist Larry
Summers by Jane Perkins, president of Friends of the Earth, in
the Wall Street Journal on March 19, 1993 illustrate the extent to
which some environmentalists disparage economists. Concerned
about Summers' potential appointment to a key international
post in the Treasury Department, Perkins advised that the post,
instead of going to an economist, should go to "a thinking, but
27. See DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON, 13-
26 (1988) for a discussion of the dialogical nature of politics and the
consequent conflict with the market valuation process.
28. See generally SUNSTEIN, note 2.
29. Id. at 4, 5, 108, 271, 384.
[Vol. X
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
feeling person with a sense of justice.''30 For environmentalists, the
concept of justice is inextricably bound to environmental protec-
tion. As Perkins' contrast of Summers with a person having "a
sense of justice" might imply, environmentalists believe econo-
mists generally lack appreciation for the gravity of environmental
degradation. 3' But economists are much more diverse than envi-
ronmentalists tend to realize. In that diversity lies a path for
bringing the market into the environmental fold.
While environmentalists know well enough the fascination of
economists with costs, this emphasis deserves something beyond
facile disparagement. Concern with the monetary value of ob-
jects and actions are too often associated with greedy material-
ism. However, even on the surface, there can be no denying that
protection of endangered species or any other resource requires
sensitivity to avoiding waste. This market concept of cost minimi-
zation is one that can fulfill political purposes, once the objective
of the environmental activity emanates from the collective voice.
A common assumption is that a concern with costs is merely a
cloak for protecting business from environmental regulation. But
sensitivity to costs has no necessary link to protection of anyone's
interests. This misunderstanding develops because the rhetoric of
cost-saving is so successfully deployed in an individualistic culture
by those trying to avoid regulation.
Opportunity cost is "the cost of using resources for a certain
purpose, measured by the benefit given by not using them in
their best alternative use." 32 In this definition, "resources" can be
broadly construed as the land, time, and labor that constitute
any project. In economics textbooks, the classic example given of
opportunity cost is a student's decision to attend college. Had
the student not attended college, the money s/he could have
earned working full time and how s/he could have spent his/her
time and college expenses are his/her opportunity costs of pur-
suing a degree in higher education.
30. John DiClimente, Environmental Moralist Dehumanizes Economist,
WALL STREET JoURNAL, April 2, 1993 (emphasis added).
31. See Robert Repetto, Accounting for Environmental Assets, 6 SCIEN-
TIFIC AMER. 94 (1992).
32. RicHARD G. LIPSEY, ET AL., MICROECONOMIcs 548 (9th ed. 1990).
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Opportunity cost suggests that there are trade-offs involved in
making any decision, including those pertaining to environmen-
tal policy. To put this quite bluntly, how important is pollution-
free air vis-a-vis feeding starving people or providing people with
jobs? To the extent that environmental protection employs re-
sources, other legitimate policies like giving shelter to homeless
people are deprived of resources that could be useful to them.
With no conceivable exceptions, "environmental quality must be
traded off against other economic goods and services."33
The concept of opportunity costs does not devalue the impor-
tance of environmental protection. That a particular method of
protecting endangered species deprives other policy initiatives of
resources does not necessarily make that method unfair and fool-
ish. In fact, the very idea of opportunity costs suggests that such
relative deprivation is intrinsic to the employment of resources.
One advantage of market solutions is the automaticity of op-
portunity cost calculations as a prerequisite to profit maximiza-
tion. To ignore opportunity costs in the private sector is to risk
bankruptcy or a decline in assets. Environmentalists can work to
take advantage of the cost minimization proclivities of firms by
statutorily altering the cost structure of firms. Tax and subsidy
adjustments pursuant to contributions of firms toward protection
of endangered species permit an environmental partnership be-
tween the two spheres.
In the same way that they disparage any type of cost orienta-
tion as a sign of private greed, environmentalists often criticize
economic growth. Despite the fact that economic growth is often
correctly associated with unplanned development, the idea of ec-
onomic growth has no intrinsic hostility to protecting endan-
gered species or environmental protection in general. Economic
growth can help provide the means for constructing schools, day-
care centers, and bridges as well as giving aid to the disadvan-
taged and any number of other legitimate causes, including the
funding of environmental protection. Economically undeveloped
nations have choices much more stark than we do concerning
33. JOSEPH J. SENECA & MICHAEL K TAUSSIG, ENVIRONMENTAL Eco-
NOMICS 4 (2nd ed. 1979).
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the environment. 34 While we might have to decide whether we
should save the spotted owl and force many loggers to rely on el-
ements of our social safety net, such as unemployment insur-
ance, poor nations often have to choose between the preserva-
tion of themselves (i.e. eating) and the preservation of nature.
These contrasting opportunity costs of environmental protection
help explain why the richer nations (e.g. United States and Ca-
nada) have superior environmental quality vis-a-vis poorer na-
tions (e.g. Mexico) in the industrialized world.
Thus, economic growth and justice are not mutually exclusive.
Indeed, the fastest growing market segment is the "socially-
responsible investment movement" whose assets have grown from
$40 billion in 1982 to $650 billion in 1991. 31 Just as economic
growth can be an engine of injustice, so too can it promote envi-
ronmental quality. Hence, belittling economic growth and the
market forces that can advance it, without asking what kind of
economic growth or what its implications are, can sometimes sti-
fle the augmentation of environmental justice.
One final point about the potential partnership between mar-
kets and environmental protection is the faulty reification of the
market as monomorphic. Markets, regardless of their structural
differences and divergent contexts, have certain common ten-
dencies. For example, as explained above, they tend to en-
courage cost reduction. But an important point for those who
wish to use markets for political purposes is the realization that
when we talk about markets, it is important to consider the type
of market about which we are speaking. As we have argued
above about economic growth, markets are neither inherently
good nor inherently bad. Instead, a market's goodness or bad-
ness depends on the purposes that it serves.
Not only do markets not have a moral essence, they also do
not exist apart from our designs. The community draws the
boundaries of their behavior. While they are hardly passive as
these determinations are made, firms must obey the tax, subsidy,
34. See generally, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990's: REFORM OR
REACTION? (Norman J. Vig et al. eds., 1997).
35. HAZEL HENDERSON, PARADIGMS AND PROGRESS: LIFE BEYOND ECO-
NOMICS 71-5 (1991).
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and regulatory climate that is provided to them. Insofar as de-
mocracy is more than a mirage, we legislatively decide the struc-
ture of a market, its goodness or badness, and its justice or
unjustness.
Indeed, we have already witnessed the beneficial role that mar-
ket incentives could play in improving the environment. Deposits
on bottles and cans in Oregon3 6 and other states have dramati-
cally improved recycling efforts. Tax breaks to landowners for
wildlife preservation have not only afforded many species the
freedom to flourish in their natural environment, they also have
signaled that pristine forests, untouched and unused, do have
collective value.
In conclusion, the market is neither friend nor foe of politics.
It is a policy instrument. While it cannot be emphasized enough
that market actors are vigorous in articulating their interests, the
market process can be harnessed for objectives emerging
through political decisions.
IV. THE ANALOGY BETWEEN CHILDREN AND ENDANGERED SPECIES
As the previous section demonstrates, the distinction between
public and private spheres is both real and overdrawn. There-
fore, the tendency to dichotomize and to advocate that a particu-
lar commodity be treated as purely a public good or purely a pri-
vate good is a threat to reflective public policy, especially in areas
like those covered by the ESA. In such hotly contested areas of
public policy, the inclination to substitute strident ideological
posturing can overwhelm the potential for meaningful
compromises.
A more appropriate question may be "what partnership should
exist between the market and the state in addressing this particu-
lar problem?" The usefulness of this approach could be seen by
comparing the needs and suggested public policies toward two
entities that by dint of their vulnerability cannot follow the indi-
vidualistic counsel of self-reliance: children and endangered
species.
36. See OR. REV. STAT. § .459a .700-.740 (1995).
[Vol. X
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A. Children
Arguments about the proper treatment of children by our
community abound.37 Some people argue that the state should
play a substantial role in providing for our youth.38 Others advo-
cate a laissez-faire ideology and despise the notion of the govern-
ment subsidizing the birth or upbringing of children.3 9 The for-
mer view children as essentially like public goods, whereas the
37. See DAVID CHEAL, NEW POVERTY. FAMILIES IN POSTMODERN SOCIETY
76 (1996) (stating that "questions about distributive justice for children
(between families with children and families without children, and
among families with different numbers of children) are notoriously
hard to resolve").
38. See generally NANCY FOLBRE, WHO PAYS FOR THE KIDS?: GENDER
AND THE STRUCTURES OF CONSTRAINT (1994). Folbre, a Marxist feminist,
examines the role that collective identity and action play in forming so-
cial preferences. She argues that as a consequence of persistent patriar-
chal structures of constraint, women bear a disproportionate share of
the costs of caring for children, as well as for the sick and the elderly.
Folbre's exploration of the question, "Who pays for the kids?" leads
her to conclude that "parents in general, [and] single mothers in par-
ticular need more support for the valuable non-market labor they per-
form." Id. at 260. See also SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT & CORNEL WEST, THE
WAR AGAINST PARENTS (1998). Hewlett and West lament government's
withdrawal of financial and legislative support of parents. They com-
pare the situation facing parents today to that faced by parents in the
1950s and conclude that government's support of individualistic poli-
cies has left parents today at a marked disadvantage compared to par-
ents during the 1950s. To restore the former situation, the authors pro-
pose a Parents' Bill of Rights, based on 1) time for children; 2)
economic security; 3) a pro-family electoral system; 4) a pro-family legal
structure; 5) a supportive external environment; and 6) honor and dig-
nity. Specific policies they advocate include paid parenting leave, a
safety net, a living wage, tax relief, housing subsidies for parents, and
family health care coverage. Id. at 231-32.
39. Critics of welfare policies that partially subsidize the costs of
children to poor single women represent the most vocal members of
this group. See, e.g., RICHARD HERNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 548 (1994)
(arguing that public subsidies to poor families has a "dysgenic" effect
on the American population by encouraging births by less-intelligent
mothers); see also Charles Murray, What To Do About Welfare, 98 COMMEN-
TARY 26 (arguing that the best way to halt our soaring national rates of
illegitimacy is to eradicate welfare).
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latter view them like private goods. Into which category do chil-
dren fall? In order to approach an answer to that question, let us
first examine our society's current treatment of children.
1. Government Policy Toward Parenting
Over the past 30 years, government support of parents has
eroded substantially.40 Throughout the early postwar years,41 the
United States government substantially subsidized the costs of
raising a child. Married wage earners' tax liabilities were cut in
half, and they received a tax exemption equivalent to about
$6500 per child in 1996 dollars.42 Additionally, the GI Bill sup-
plied many new parents with unemployment insurance, medical
coverage, and housing subsidies. 43 During this "Golden Era" for
the American family, children were treated as public goods, as
the substantial government support indicates.44
However, the 1960s brought a series of tax policies that under-
mined the American family. The large deductions for children
vanished, as did the wide availability of housing subsidies. The
tax policy shifted to favor single individuals in many instances. 45
40. See HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 38, at 122. "What we have re-
ally done over the past thirty years is socialize the costs of growing old
and privatize child-rearing."
41. Sylvia Ann Hewlett and Cornel West refer to this period as "a
glorious era for the American family," despite criticisms that the 1950s
were boring and oppressive. See id. at 98.
42. See id. at 99.
43. See id. at 99-100. Additionally, the GI Bill provided vast educa-
tional opportunities for many American citizens. "Its educational bene-
fits enabled 2.2 million WWII veterans to attend college .... It helped
pay for the training of 450,000 engineers, 180,000 doctors, dentists and
nurses, 360,000 schoolteachers, 150,000 scientists, 243,000 accountants,
107,000 lawyers, and 36,000 clergy." See Hearings on Legislation to Provide
GI Bill Benefits for Post Korean Veterans Before the House Committee on Veter-
ans' Affairs, 89th Cong. 3091 (1965), cited in HEWLETT & WEST, supra
note 38, at 100.
44. Additionally, strong unions during that era buttressed parents
by ensuring that working parents brought home a living wage. See Hew-
lett & West, supra note 38, at 64.
45. See id. (arguing both that the 1960s' tax policy shifts created a
marriage disincentive for some groups by charging lower taxes to single
individuals, and that many housing subsidies were filtered toward single
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Additionally, payroll taxes soared, leaving parents with less dis-
posable income. Such changes were not unique to the 1960s, but
continued throughout the following decades.
Today, income tax deductions for children are minuscule com-
pared to those enjoyed by parents during the 1960s.46 Addition-
ally, housing subsidies for working class people are virtually non-
existent, as subsidies have been funneled to the upper class.
47
These changes have resulted in what is essentially a government
withdrawal of support for parents, especially working class par-
ents, and consequently, families with children have become
much poorer than those without children.48 In this sense, it is
clear that our society and our policymakers view children as the
responsibility of the parents, 49 and therefore, as more similar to
individuals). See also America's Families: Conditions, Trends, Hopes and
Fears: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families,
102d Cong. 153 (1992) [hereinafter America's Families] (statement of
Robert Rector, Policy Analyst for Family and Welfare Issues, The Heri-
tage Foundation). Rector states, "[I]n 1950, the average American fam-
ily paid 2 percent of its income to the Federal Government in taxation.
... Today, that same family pays 24 percent of its income to the Fed-
eral Government in taxes." This jump in the rate of taxation costs the
average family $8200 per year.
46. See HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 38, at 88 (demonstrating that
our current tax code provides greater funds to subsidize caring for hor-
ses than caring for children).
47. In 1996, about $33 billion of federal money went to mortgage
income tax deductions for households with incomes over $100,000.
This figure is almost 4 times what the government spends on low-
income housing. See id. at 108. Additionally, over 6 million households
spent more than 50 percent of their income on rent. See id. at 105.
48. See CHEAL, supra note 37, at 79.
In the United States, families with children are less well off
than families without children, whether adjusted income is
calculated per capita or per reference equivalent. Median
net income per reference equivalent in U.S. consumer units
with children is 15 percent below that of consumer units
with no children. The shortfall in net income per capita is
much larger, at 44 percent. . . . In the United States, 19.0
percent of consumer units with children fall in the lowest
decile of net income per capita, whereas only 4.8 percent of
consumer units without children do so.
49. See RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF
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private goods than public goods. Despite this withdrawal in gov-
ernment support, we argue to the contrary that children resem-
ble public goods more than they do private goods.50
2. Ways in Which Children Resemble Public Goods
Several reasons exist for labeling children as public goods.
First, since children are unable to care for themselves,5 they can-
not be held accountable for themselves. Furthermore, structural
shifts in both government policy and the economy over the past
several decades have made it more difficult for parents to bear
the financial burdens of raising children without external
support.12
In addition to the government's reducing support of parents
POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT AMERICA 190 (1986). "The lack of prenatal
care and well-baby care for all Americans; the lack of first-rate, accessi-
ble day care and after-school care; and the lack of an adequate child
welfare system for those in need all indicate that American society has
told its mothers and children that they will have to go it alone."
50. But see Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adop-
tions, 67 B.U. L. REv. 59 (1987) (arguing that the market in adoption
should be freer than it currently is).
51. See CHEAL, supra note 37 at 76-77 (1996). Cheal notes that two
principal criteria are used when determining distributive justice: effort
bargaining and degree of need. Effort bargaining holds that the re-
wards of different groups should be determined by their efforts. Con-
versely, degree of need holds that whichever group has the most need
ought to receive the most resources. Because of children's undeveloped
condition, effort bargaining is rarely applied to children.
52. In contrast to the United States' paltry social safety net, Swe-
den has an array of policies designed to strengthen the family and to
ensure that parents will be able to provide and care for their children.
For example, Swedish mothers with children under 8 years old are able
to work reduced hours for reduced pay and maintain their jobs. See
SIDEL, supra note 49, at 180. Parents are provided with a yearly allow-
ance for each child born to them until the child reaches age 16 (age
18 if the child remains in school). Id. at 180. Swedish parents are also
provided with childcare, id. at 184-87, and a parental insurance pro-
gram that allows them to take up to nine months off work and con-
tinue to be paid 90% of their pre-leave weekly wages. Id. at 181. For a
further discussion of the Swedish child care program, see Chapter 2 of
ALFRED J. KAHN & SHEILA B. KAMERMAN, NOT FOR THE POOR ALONE: Eu-
ROPEAN SOCIAL SERVICES 18 (1975).
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through housing subsidies and tax exemptions, 3 it has failed to
remedy the effects of a hostile job market. The past four decades
have seen a massive exodus of stable, well paying manufacturing
jobs.54 Such jobs provide solid employment opportunities for
semi-skilled and low-skilled workers and also provide wages on
which families lived. Due to the absence of such jobs and the
massive slowdown in wage growth, 5 more and more parents are
finding it difficult to cover the costs of supporting their
families.16
Another reason that children more closely resemble public
goods than private goods is the inappropriateness of using
money as a metric of their value. Private goods, such as cars, can
easily be assigned a monetary value. They are easily traded on
the market, and they allow the possessor to place a monetary
value on the satisfaction derived from their consumption. On the
53. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
54. This problem is especially concentrated among residents of the
inner city. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE
WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR, 29-30 (1996) (hereinafter WJ. WILSON,
1996). Wilson notes, "In the twenty-year period from 1967-1987, Phila-
delphia lost 64 percent of its manufacturing jobs; Chicago lost 60 per-
cent; New York City, 58 percent; Detroit, 51 percent. In absolute num-
bers, these percentages represent the loss of 160,000 jobs in
Philadelphia, 326,000 in Chicago, 520,000 - over half a million - in
New York, and 108,000 in Detroit." Id.
55. See America's Families, supra note 45, at 154 (statement of Mr.
Rector). "In the 1950s and 1960s, the real income of the average hus-
band, adjusted for inflation, doubled between 1950 and 1970. Between
1970 and [1992] the real post-inflation income of the average husband,
pre-tax, went up about 10 to 20 percent."
56. See SIDEL, supra note 49, at 190-91.
Millions of women are a divorce away from destitution; mil-
lions of workers are a layoff away from poverty. An illness, an
unexpected pregnancy, the death of the primary wage-
earner, or the move of a company plant to a Third-World
country can precipitate a family's fall into dire straits. What
must be stressed is that many of these events are beyond the
control of any given person and therefore cannot be han-
dled by the individual alone.
See generally WJ. WILSON, 1996, supra note 54 (discussing the effects of
joblessness on urban neighborhoods and the process in which children
in such neighborhoods are socialized).
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other hand, public goods, such as national defense or clean air,
cannot be so easily valued. It makes little sense to attempt to de-
termine in dollars how much our perceived security from foreign
invasion is worth. Similarly, the dollar value of a child cannot be
calculated. Any determination of the monetary value of a child is
not just extremely difficult rather it is patently inappropriate.5 7
Moreover, the benefits that result from good parenting accrue
less to the parents than to society as a whole. In past centuries,
children more closely resembled private goods because parents
were direct beneficiaries of their labor. Farm families characteris-
tically had many children because the more children present, the
more the farmwork could be distributed among members of the
family.58 This additional labor allowed families to increase their
output or avoid having to hire paid farmhands. Parents, however,
no longer reap economic benefits from their children's labor.
Children are unable to work for pay until long after they are
born.59 Even then, their families receive little, if any, economic
benefit.
Society benefits disproportionately from parents' efforts.6° Well-
raised and well-educated children become our society's taxpayers,
civic leaders, and lawmakers. Thus, the whole of society benefits
from their efforts. Conversely, when children are raised in less-
nurturing environments, society pays.61 The correlation between
57. See J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO
LJ. 341, 351 (1984). Prichard argues that attaching a price to children
violates two principles that we hold dear: 1) that human life in infi-
nitely valuable, and 2) that all lives are equally valuable. See also infra,
notes 81-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of alternative sys-
tems of valuation.
58. See FOLBRE, supra note 38, at 106. "In agrarian societies ...
small children .. .can begin to contribute to production at a relatively
early age."
59. See id. at 107 (arguing that child labor laws prevent children
from making significant financial contributions to the family).
60. See HEWLETr & WEST, supra note 38, at 28 ("Children are 100
percent our collective future.").
61. See id. at 42. "When a child is deprived of parental love, that
youngster is liable to grow up in an infantilized state .. .never devel-
oping a love of self, never developing the ability to reach out to others.
This is .. .a recipe for civic collapse." See also id. at 44 (citing a study
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a lack of parental nurturing and deviant behavior in later life is
strong.62 Thus, failing to ensure that children are brought up in
a healthy environment costs society as a whole. These costs may
include damage to property, criminal investigations, trials, and
incarceration.
Parents also suffer from asymmetric information about the
costs of parenting. While estimates of the cost of raising a child
are available, 63 such estimates leave many questions unanswered.
Will the child .need braces? Will she require special schooling?
Will the cost of a college education continue to outpace infla-
tion? How much will a temporary withdrawal from the labor mar-
estimating the costs to taxpayers of one violent young person at $1.5
million); FOLBRE, supra note 38 at 260 ("If children can be public
goods, they can also be public bads.").
. 62. See HEWLETr & WEST, supra note 38, at 48. " [W] hether a child
acquires self discipline and self-esteem and becomes a well-adjusted,
productive person is largely a function of parental input and how well
both parent and child are supported by the wider community." (citing
David C. Rowe & Robert Plomin, The Importance of Nonshared (El) Envi-
ronmental Influences in Behavioral Development, 17 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 517 (1981)). See also HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 38, at 49
("A weight of evidence now demonstrates ominous links between ab-
sentee parents and an entire range of behavioral and emotional
problems in children."); Ridgely Ochs, Linking Childhood Abuse to Adult
Behavior Problems, NEWSDAY, May 26, 1998, at C4 (reviewing a study find-
ing a correlation between abuse and neglect during childhood and un-
healthy behavior such as smoking, obesity, and substance abuse during
adulthood).
63. Current estimates of the cost of raising a child to age 18 are
around $145,000. Such estimates exclude the cost of a college educa-
tion and income lost by staying at home with the child instead of work-
ing. See HEWLETr & WEST, supra note 38, at 35. In 1983, the net present
value of the cost of raising a child born in 1980 to an average family
were estimated at $141,623 (1982 dollars), which constituted 21.9% of
the family's income. When four years at a private college were consid-
ered, the costs rose to $147,363 (22.8% of the family's income). See
LAWRENCE OLSON, COSTS OF CHILDREN 29 (1983). See also FOLBRE supra
note 38, at 104-125 (describing factors that influence the cost of chil-
dren and the distribution of these costs). Folbre argues that factors
completely beyond the parents' control often influence the costs of
children, and that women pay a disproportionate share of the costs of
raising a child due to structures of constraint placed upon women.
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ket harm my future earnings?64
An appropriate example of parental lack of knowledge of the
costs of children is education. A generation ago, a college educa-
tion was not a necessity to ensure stable, well-paying, employ-
ment. However, due to structural shifts in our economy, low- and
semi-skilled jobs disappeared, 65 leaving only jobs that featured ad-
vanced educational requirements.66 These increasing educational
requirements translated to increasing costs of childrearing. 67 Par-
ents twenty years ago did not know that such requirements
would be in place today, nor did they know the extent to which
such requirements would increase their costs. 68 As a result of this
lack of knowledge, they were unable to plan for such costs. Be-
cause parents lack knowledge of the costs associated with parent-
ing, it is wrong to hold them responsible for these costs. '
Finally, children more closely resemble private goods because.
of the imbalance in distributional power. Structural economic
changes in the past fifty years have widened the class gap,69 leav-
ing some families more easily able to afford the financial costs of
childrearing and others less able to do so. Examples of such
changes include the loss of low- and semi-skilled manufacturing
64. According to the Rand Corporation, a two- to four-year break
lowers lifetime earnings by 13 percent and a five-year break results in a
19 percent reduction. See Hewlett & West, supra note 38, at 39.
65. See WILSON, supra note 54 and accompanying text.
66. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE IN-
NER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 39-41 (1987) (hereinafter
WJ. WILSON 1987). Wilson notes that between 1970 and 1984, New York
City lost 492,000 low-skill jobs, but gained 239,000 jobs that required
advanced education.
67. See FOLBRE, supra note 38, at 107.
68. See Ethan Bronner, College Tuitions Climb 5 Percent, Survey Finds,
N.Y TIMES, Sept. 25, 1997, at A18. The survey cited in this article noted
that in 1997, the average tuition hike was five percent. Even though
this figure is over twice the rate of inflation over the same period of
time, it is not as high as tuition increases were during the 1980s.
69. See America's Families, supra note 45, at 187 (statement of Greg
Duncan, Ph.D., Program Director, Survey Research Center, University
of Michigan). " [W] hile a number of middle-income families were find-
ing it easier to ascend into high income status, at the same time mid-
dle-income families were also, in larger numbers, falling out of middle
income into lower-income status."
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jobs, and the growth of high-tech jobs that require substantial
post-secondary training.70 This imbalance in the ability to raise
children, a function necessary for the survival of the human
race, requires the government to intervene in order to level the
playing field. Without such government intervention, we will face
a result contrary to the good of society.
3. Summary
Each example mentioned above is a way in which the market
fails in the case of child rearing. Such results are contrary to the
assumptions of the capitalist ethic, which holds that the market
will distribute goods more efficiently than any other allocative
device. Adam Smith theorized that the market system would lead
to definite results. Specifically, individual self-interest was to lead
to social harmony by motivating producers to produce "those
goods that society wants, in the quantities that society desires,
and at the prices society is prepared to pay."'" In this way, the
"private and competitive pursuit" of self-interest would be the
"source of the greatest public good. '72
Because competition serves as the regulator of the market,
profit-hungry entrepreneurs are prevented from charging exorbi-
tant prices. Were a business to do so, another business would
move in and take away its clientele. "Thus ... the selfish motives
of men are transmuted by interaction to yield the most unex-
pected of results: social harmony."7 3 However, in the case of cer-
tain items, such as children, individual greed does not lead to so-
cial harmony. Instead, it leads to neglect.
In these instances, we face an aggregation problem. In other
words, the assumption of market-oriented economists that indi-
70. See Wj. WILSON, 1996 supra note 54, at 152. "At the same time
that changes in technology are producing new jobs . . . they are mak-
ing many others obsolete .... A widening gap between the skilled and
unskilled workers is developing because education and training are
more important than ever."
71. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES,
TIMES, AND IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECONOMIC THINKERS 50 (3d ed. 1953).
72. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS IN PERSPECTIVE: A CRITI-
CA HISTORY 64 (1987).
73. See HEILBRONER, supra note 71, at 50.
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vidual inclinations expressed in the market will yield social pref-
erences 4 does not hold. Instead, the social preference (that all
children be raised in a nurturing environment) is not transmit-
ted through the market's price signals. In this sense, supply and
demand become flawed, and the government must step in to
provide a remedy.
B. Endangered Species
Just as children more closely resemble public goods than pri-
vate goods, so do endangered species. Consequently, endangered
species, like children, require a collectivist approach to their pro-
tection. While the government has treated endangered species
more like public goods than private goods since endangered spe-
cies were first offered explicit federal protection in 1966,75 the
growth of the Property Rights Movement threatens to shift public
policy toward treating endangered species like private goods. 76 It
is important that people recognize this potential shift when ex-
amining proposals for reauthorization.
Should the Property Rights Agenda make its way through Con-
gress, landowners will have full and final authority to decide how
their land is used.77 Thus, if a landowner wishes to protect en-
dangered species, she will have the option to do so. However,
74. Classical economics has its origins in the individualistic
worldview of classical liberalism. Classical liberalism asserted that peo-
ple were essentially egoistic, rationally calculating, essentially inert, and
atomistic. E.K. HUNT, supra note 9, at 38 (7th ed. 1995). Because of
their extreme emphasis on the individual, classical liberals believed that
social welfare was additive. People's egoism would lead them to make
the choices that would best benefit them, and the market would pro-
vide the setting for such choices. The market signals of supply and de-
mand reflected these preferences, and therefore, each individual's well
being and, accordingly, social welfare would be maximized when the
market was left alone.
75. The Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, (16
U.S.C.A. §668aa (repealed 1973)) was the first federal statute aimed at
preventing extinction.
76. See generally Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement:
How It Began and Where It Is Headed, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S' PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS REBELLION, 1-30 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995).
77. Id.
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landowners who are more concerned with accumulating wealth
or developing their land will be given the "green light" to de-
stroy the valuable habitat of at-risk species. Such an approach is
tantamount to treating not only the land itself, but also every-
thing on it (including endangered and threatened species), as
private goods. The Property Rights Movement overlooks the fact
that despite land's greater resemblance to a private good than a
public good, ways in which land is used may affect items (e.g.,
groundwater, air quality, endangered species, etc.) that are more
like public goods than private goods.
The case for endangered species being treated as public goods
is analogous to the case made for children being treated as pub-
lic goods. Just as children are increasingly unable to fend for
themselves, so are endangered species. The extent to which
humans have interfered with nature is so great, that without
human intervention, many species would cease to exist. Human
damage to species' prospects for survival can be illustrated by
noting the dramatic increase in the rate of extinction over the
past centuries. Since 1620, when the Pilgrims first arrived at
Plymouth Rock, North America has witnessed the extinction of
over 500 species of mammals and birds.78 To put this figure into
perspective, North America lost only forty species of birds and
fifty species of mammals to extinction over a three thousand-year
period in the Pleistocene Era.79 Clearly, humans have en-
croached on the habitat of endangered species, and if these spe-
cies are to survive, then human intervention is necessary.
Extinction is forever. Once a species vanishes from nature,
people will no longer be able to enjoy observing it. Scientists will
no longer be able to analyze it and examine its potential for cur-
ing human diseases. Furthermore, the absence of a species can
disrupt the food chain, and thereby an entire ecosystem. 80 The
78. See DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO
ITS PROTEcTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 9
79. See id. See also EDWARD Q. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 255-
258 (1992) (citing examples of species that have recently fallen victim
to extinction). Wilson argues that "[t]he cutting of primeval forest and
other disasters, fueled by the demands of growing human populations,
are the overriding threat to biological diversity everywhere." Id. at 259.
80. See WILSON, supra note 79 at 180-182.
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potential good that can be reaped from each species, as well as
the potential harm that can befall an ecosystem as a result of a
single species' absence is difficult to measure in monetary terms.
In many ways, it is also inappropriate.
An examination of alternative forms of valuation provides rea-
sons why money is not the proper metric of all transactions. Pro-
fessor Cass Sunstein argues that different types of goods are val-
ued in different ways. 81 The form of valuation for a particular
commodity determines which metrics of value is appropriate and
which are not. Thus, for some items, market exchange is inap-
propriate and therefore ought to be prohibited.82 Sunstein ar-
gues that endangered species, like other environmental "goods"
fall into this category. "Indeed, if parks and $100,000 could be al-
igned along the same metric, parks would not be parks as we
now understand them."83 Because money does not accurately re-
flect the way that endangered species are or ought to be valued,
they differ from private goods.84
Furthermore, endangered species are not like private goods
because the benefits of endangered species do not fall merely
upon the person on whose property they reside. Instead, our en-
tire society benefits from maintaining biodiversity. A large num-
ber of the medicines we use to fight disease come from plants
81. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 70-103 (1997).
82. Sunstein provides another example of an item for which mar-
ket exchange would lead to inappropriate valuation: votes. Because
trading such commodities on the market drives people to value them
in an inappropriate way, they should be blocked from market ex-
change. See id. at 96-98. See also Prichard, supra note 57, at 352.
"[C]ertain things should be above the hustle and bustle of the market-
place so as to preserve their dignity . . . That is, by creating a market
one would commodify something . . . which should not be treated as a
commodity."
83. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 85. "In environmental law, the major
issue of contestation is frequently the appropriate kind of valuation of
environmental amenities; if beaches, species, and mountains were val-
ued solely for their use, we would not be able to understand them in
the way that we now do." Id. at 103.
84. For a discussion of why attaching a monetary value to children
is inappropriate, see Prichard, supra note 57, at 351-352.
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and animals."s For example, the rosy periwinkle of Madagascar
produces two alkaloids that cure most forms of Hodgkin's disease
and acute lymphocytic leukemia patients. 8 6 Even aspirin would
not exist were it not for a plant.87 These examples only scratch
the surface of the number of drugs that owe their existence to
nature.8
The extent to which we depend on nature for medicine dem-
onstrates the importance of preserving biodiversity. This goal is
all the more important when we consider the small proportion
of species that have been tested for potential as medicines. Only
about 5000 species of plants have been examined for alkaloids,
while about 220,000 species exist.8 9 The cure for diseases such as
cancer and AIDS may be found in those species. If we allow
them to become extinct, we may be throwing away the cure to
such ailments.90
85. See ROHLF, supra note 78, at 14. See also John D. Dingell, Fore-
word to DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS
PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 1,2 (1989) (arguing that preserving
even the most minute species is impossible because even small orga-
nisms can lead to major medical breakthroughs, like mold is the
source of penicillin).
86. See EQ. WILSON, supra note 79, at 283. In the case of the rosy
periwinkle, a form of monetary valuation is possible. The income from
the manufacture and sale of these two alkaloids exceeds $180 million
per year. Id. Despite our ability to place a monetary value on the manu-
facture of the drugs, attempting to place a value on the lives saved is
still not only impossible, but also absurd.
87. See id. "Aspirin, the most widely used pharmaceutical in the
world, was derived from salicylic acid discovered in meadowsweet ...
and later combined with acetic acid to create acetylsalicylic acid, the
more effective painkiller."
88. Of all prescriptions dispensed in the United States, over 25
percent come from plants, 13 percent come from microorganisms, and
3 percent come from animals. See id. at 283, 285.
89. See id. at 285. See also ROHLF, supra note 78, at 14 (stating that
fewer than one percent of all plant species have been examined for
medicinal value).
90. This point strengthens the argument that monetary valuation
of endangered species in inappropriate. Who could possibly place a
monetary value on the cure for cancer? While economists may be able
to estimate the sales of the drug, increases in productivity resulting
from longer lives, and reductions in medical bills, these figures would
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However, we should not be persuaded only by the medicinal
uses of plants and animals. By preserving the existence of all spe-
cies, we maintain the planet's "genetic bank," which provides
human beings with alternative sources of food in case our princi-
pal food supply vanishes.9' Additionally, by maintaining biodivers-
ity, we are able to preserve the food web.92 Should a species be-
come extinct, its absence has the potential to disrupt the food
web. Such a disruption, even if caused by the extinction of a
small plant or insect, can have dire consequences for an entire
ecosystem.93
Scientists may also use plants and animals as scientific models.
Because the plants and animals that exist today have been able
to withstand natural disasters as well as human development,
they are remarkably adaptable. Michigan Representative John
Dingell states,
Living plants and animals have, through the centuries, devel-
oped a means of coping with disease, drought, predation and a
myriad of other threats. Understanding how they do so enables
us to improve the pest and drought resistance of our crops, dis-
cover new medicines for the conquest of disease and make
other advances vital to our welfare. Living wild species are like
a library of books still unread. Our heedless destruction of
them is akin to burning that library without ever having read its
books.94
Another way in which endangered species more closely resem-
ble public goods than private goods is that beneficiaries of main-
taining biodiversity suffer from asymmetric information. First, we
lack information about what exactly society loses when an endan-
gered species becomes extinct (and many of the potential losses
are beyond monetary value). Therefore, the costs of failing to
not reflect true value of the years added to the lives of cancer patients.
91. See ROHLF, supra note 78, at 14.
92. See RoHI, supra note 78, at 16.
93. See ROHLF, supra note 78, at 15-17 (describing how a species'
absence may cause pests, such as rats, to overrun an area).
94. John D. Dingell, Foreword to DANIEL J. ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (1989).
Dingell is a long-standing environmentalist in the House of Representa-
tives. He introduced the Bill that later became the Endangered Species
Act.
[Vol. X
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
maintain biodiversity are, as demonstrated above, impossible to
calculate with any degree of certainty.
Finally, nobody knows what the future holds for endangered
species. Nature is unpredictable and events such as droughts,
blizzards, or floods may ravish an area that is home to a popula-
tion of endangered species. If endangered species are given only
weak protection, such natural disasters could result in the extinc-
tion of an entire species. Consequently, it is important that we
offer endangered species the best protection possible.
To offer endangered species the best protection possible, we
must adopt a collectivist approach. If we were to experiment with
an individualist approach and leave endangered species protec-
tion up to individuals, social preferences would not be ade-
quately expressed through the price signals of the market.95 The
net result would be that endangered species would be offered
not only less protection than society as a whole desires, but also
less protection than would be most beneficial to society.
V. PROTECTING ENDANGERED SPECIES BY STATUTE
A. Background on the Endangered Species Act
Following the Second World War, the United States entered an
era of unrivaled economic prosperity. However, this development
came with grave consequences for numerous species other than
Homo sapiens. As a result of heavy development and a lack of con-
cern for other species, many types of plants and animals in the
United States were driven to extinction.96 Many others were soon
to follow. The public recognized that such growth was having
95. An important reason why this aggregation problem exists is
the size of the players in today's economy. Giant corporations and
equally giant labor unions obviously do not behave as individual propri-
etors and workers. Their very bulk enables them to stand out against
the pressures of competition, to disregard price signals, and to con-
sider what their self-interest shall be in the long run, rather than in the
immediate press of each day's selling. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE
WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES, TIMES, AND IDEAS OF THE GREAT ECO-
NOMIC THINKERS 49-50 (1953). Because of corporations' large sizes and
vast power, they are able to overlook the public's preferences related to
costs and effects (such as habitat destruction) that arise as a conse-
quence of their producing goods and services.
96. See ROHLF, supra note 78, at 7-12.
1999]
184 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
deleterious effects on America's natural resources and pressured
Congress to remedy this problem. 97 Congress responded by pass-
ing the Endangered Species Act of 1973,98 which was intended to
prevent more of our nation's wildlife from extinction. Congress
found that:
(1) various species of fish, wildlife and plants in the United
States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of eco-
nomic growth and development untempered by adequate con-
cern and conservation;
(2) other species of fish, wildlife and plants have been so de-
pleted in numbers that they are in danger of or threatened
with extinction.99
Because such species are of "esthetic, ecological, educational, his-
torical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its
people,"'' ° Congress held that protecting them was in the best
interest of the public. 0 1 Consequently, the ESA gave conservation
a more prominent role in our public policy.
B. Major Provisions of the Act
To gain a better understanding of the ESA and the recent shift
in enforcement, a working knowledge of the Act's implementa-
tion is imperative. The ESA provides a method for determining
which species are to be listed, 102 designing plans for protection, 10 3
97. See Martha F. Phelps, Candidate Conservation Agreements Under
the Endangered Species Act: Prospects and Perils of an Administrative Experi-
ment, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 175, 178 (1997); Matt Campbell & Jef-
frey Spivak, Can They Be Saved?: Wildlife Victories Outweigh Defeats, KC.
STAR, June 29, 1997, at Al.
98. 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 1531-1544.
99. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1531 (a).
100. Id. at § 1531(a) (3).
101. Congress stated:
The purposes of this Act are to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for
the conservation of such endangered species .... and to take
such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of
the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of
this section.
Id. at § 1531(b).
102. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533.
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and ensuring the cooperation of government agencies in protect-
ing the species. 1° These tasks are critical to the protection of en-
dangered and threatened species in the United States.
1. Listing
The ESA charges the Secretary of the Interior'0 and the Secre-
tary of Commerce 10 6 with the duty to designate at-risk species as
endangered or threatened. A species is listed as endangered
when it is "in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range."10 7 Any species whose numbers have been so
depleted that the species is likely to become endangered in the
foreseeable future is designated "threatened." 0
Once the Secretary or a private party proposes that a species
be listed as either endangered or threatened, the agency follows
the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 1°9 Thus, the proposed listing is
published in the Federal Register within 90 days of the proposal.
Within one year, the Secretary must either publish the listing
(making the species in question officially endangered or
threatened), request a one-time-only six-month extension, or
withdraw the proposed listing. 110
In determining the proper status of a species,"' the Secretary
may consider only five criteria:
1. the present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of its habitat or range;
103. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1534(a).
104. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536.
105. The Secretary of the Interior acts through the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) to protect at-risk terrestrial species.
106. The Secretary of Commerce is in charge of designations of
aquatic species and carries out this task through the National Marine
Fisheries Services (NMFS).
107. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1532(6).
108. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1532(20).
109. 5 U.S.C.S. § 533.
110. See 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(b)(6).
111. Courts have held that the Secretary is compelled by the ESA
to list at-risk species; the duty to list is not discretionary. See, e.g., Pacific
Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 E2d 829, 838-39 (6th Cir. 1981).
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2. overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes;
3. disease or predation;
4. the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
5. other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued
existence. "12
The Secretary's decision is based on "the best scientific and
commercial data available" '113 regarding these criteria. Impor-
tantly, Congress forbade the Secretary from considering eco-
nomic reasons for or against the listing of species. 1 4 Thus, it is
clear from examining the process by which species are listed as
threatened or endangered, that Congress regarded them as pub-
lic goods.
In addition to the standard listing process, the Secretary has
the power to list an at-risk species immediately as a result of an
emergency listing provision in the ESA." 5 This provision frees
the agency from the often-tedious process of administrative
rulemaking. When the agency decides to invoke the emergency
provision, it must publish the listing plus reasons why the emer-
gency listing is necessary. 16 Additionally, the agency must notify
states that are home to the species." 7 Such a listing is valid for
only 240 days,' during which time the agency has the opportu-
nity to exercise a standard listing for that species.
Once a species is listed, 1 9 certain actions become illegal. For
112. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(a)(1).
113. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
114. In addition to Congress' refusal to allow the Secretary to con-
sider economic reasons, the courts have further proscribed the criteria
upon which the Secretary may make a decision regarding the listing of
species.
Specifically, courts have held that the Secretary may not take
into account the possibility of future conservation plans for a
species when making a listing decision .... In addition, at
least one court has held that the Secretary may not be influ-
enced by political factors in his or her decision.
Phelps, supra note 97, at 180-181.
115. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(b)(7).
116. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(b)(7)(A).
117. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(b) (7) (B).
118. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(b) (7).
119. Additionally, the Secretary has the power to treat unlisted
species as if they were listed. The ESA holds:
[Vol. X
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
example, all people under the jurisdiction of the United States
are unable to "possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship" any
endangered species. 120
The Secretary may, by regulation, and to the extent he
deems advisable, treat any species as an endangered species
or threatened species even though it is not listed pursuant to
section 4 of this Act if he finds that:
A. such species so closely resembles in appearance, at the
point in question, a species which has been listed pursu-
ant to such section that enforcement personnel would
have substantial difficulty in attempting to differentiate
between the listed and unlisted species;
B. the effect of this substantial difficulty is an additional
threat to an endangered or threatened species; and
C. such treatment of an unlisted species will substantially fa-
cilitate the enforcement and further the policy of this
Act.
16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(e).
When this clause is invoked, the protection granted is somewhat
weaker than that granted to listed species. The taking of these "similar
species" is allowed when proper permits are obtained. 16 U.S.C.S. §
1533(e), cited in Nancy Kubasek, Reauthorizing the Endangered Species Act:
What Can We Learn from Our Canadian Neighbors?, 1 J. OF THE PAC.
SOUTHWEST AcAD. OF LEGAL STUD. IN Bus. 18, n.19.
120. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1538(a) (1) (D). More specifically, the ESA states:
[W]ith respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pur-
suant to section 4 of this Act, it is unlawful for any person subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States to-
A. import any such species into, or export any such species
from the United States;
B. take any such species within the United States or the ter-
ritorial sea of the United States;
C. take any such species upon the high seas;
D. possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship, by any
means whatsoever, any such species taken in violation of
subparagraphs (B) and (C);
E. deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or
foreign commerce, by any means whatsoever and in the
course of a commercial activity, any such species;
F. sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce
any such species; or
G. violate any regulation pertaining to such species or to any
threatened species of fish or wildlife pursuant to section 4
of this Act and promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to
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Additionally, it is illegal "to take" an endangered or
threatened species. 2' Violators of the ESA are subject to both
civil 122 and criminal 23 penalties. Suits against violators may be
brought by the responsible agency or by a private party. 24 Addi-
tionally, once a species is listed, the Secretary must designate its
critical habitat. 25 The term "critical habitat" is defined as:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by
the species, at the time it is listed in accordance with the provi-
sions of [section 4 of 15 U.S.C.S. §1533], on which are found
those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conser-
vation of the species and (II) which may require special man-
agement considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by
the species at the time it is listed in accordance with the provi-
sions of [section 4 of 15 U.S.C.S. §1533], upon a determination
authority provided by this Act.
Id. at § 1538(a)(1) (internal citation omitted).
Additionally, Section 1538 (a)(2) provides protection for endan-
gered plants.
121. See supra note 19. Congress defined "to take" as "to harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C.S. § 1532(19).
122. See 16 U.S.C.S. § 1540(a)(1).
123. See id. at § 1540(b)(1).
124. 16 U.S.C.S. § 154 0(g) provides for suits by private parties. Pri-
vate citizens may sue
A. to enjoin any person, including the United States and any
other governmental instrumentality or agency ... ,who is
alleged to be in violation of any provision of this Act or
regulation issued under the authority thereof; or
B. to compel the Secretary to apply... the prohibitions set
forth in . . . this Act with respect to the taking of any resi-
dent endangered species or threatened species within any
State; or
C. against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of
the Secretary to perform any act or duty under section 4
which is not discretionary with the Secretary.
Id. A recent example of a private suit occurred in January 1998. In this
suit, a group of environmentalists brought suit against Pacific Lumber
Company for logging near streams that contained the listed coho
salmon. See Nancy Vogel, Suit Filed on Behalf of Coho Salmon, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Jan. 27, 1998, at B3 (describing the facts surrounding the case).
125. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(b) (2).
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by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the conserva-
tion of the species. 126
Contrary to the process by which a species is listed, the Secretary
is required to make economic considerations when designating
the critical habitat.1
27
The Secretary's final ruling on the species' critical habitat' 28
ought to be given along with her final determination of the spe-
cies' listing. However, if the ruling is not possible at that time,
the Secretary may have an additional year to designate the criti-
cal habitat. 29 The designation must include a description of the
area and an evaluation of public or private activities that may
damage the critical habitat. 130
2. Recovery plans
In addition to providing for the listing of species and forbid-
ding parties from harming them or their habitat, the ESA also
requires the development of recovery plans. Recovery plans are
126. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1532(5)(1973).
127. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(b)(2). The Secretary is also given the
power to:
exclude any area from critical habitat if he determines that
the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of speci-
fying such area as part of the critical habitat, unless he deter-
mines, based on the best scientific and commercial data
available, that the failure to designate such area as critical
habitat will result in the extinction of the species concerned.
128. Courts have determined that the Secretary's duty to designate
critical habitat for a species is mandatory, not discretionary. See North-
ern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991). In Spot-
ted Ow, the District Court ruled that Lujan, the then-Secretary of the
Interior, had abused his discretion when he failed to designate critical
habitat for the spotted owl along with his decision to list the species.
The court held that designation of critical habitat must coincide with
the listing of a species unless surrounding conditions are such that the
timely designation of critical habitat would be impossible.
129. Despite these requirements, critical habitats are frequently
not defined for listed species. See Lee Ann Welch, Property Rights Con-
flicts Under the Endangered Species Act: Protection of the Red-Cockaded Wood-
pecker, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990'S PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 151, 158
(Bruce Yandle ed. 1995) (noting that only 12% of listed species in the
U.S. have critical habitat listed).
130. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(b) (8).
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"technical, scientific documents"1 31 that delineate the steps neces-
sary "for the conservation and survival of ' 132 listed species. Gen-
erally, a recovery plan details the current status of the species in
question, threats to its survival, actions necessary for the survival
of the species, a description of how to perform such tasks, and
an estimated population size at which the species could be re-
moved from the list without risking extinction. 133 These plans are
prepared by public and private sector biologists and carried out
by recovery teams. Recovery teams are comprised of parties from
state agencies, federal agencies, and the private sector 34
Because the ESA receives limited funding, the Seicretary is una-
ble to provide all recovery plans with equal attention and re-
sources. 35 Consequently, Congress provided that in the execu-
tion of recovery plans, priority should be given to the species
most likely to benefit from the implementation of a recovery
plan. 136
131. Nancy Kubasek, M. Neil Browne, & Robyn Mohn-Klee, The
Endangered Species Act: Time for a New Approach?, 24 ENVWL. L. 329, 333
(1994).
132. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(f)(1).
133. See Phelps, supra note 97, at 183. The ESA also requires recov-
ery plans to include "estimates of the time required and the cost to
carry out those measures needed to achieve the plan's goal and to
achieve intermediate steps toward that goal." 16 U.S.C.S. §
1533 (f) (1) (B) (iii).
134. See 16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(f)(2). "The Secretary, in developing
and implementing recovery plans .... may procure the services of ap-
propriate public and private agencies and institutions, and other quali-
fied persons."
135. See note 131, supra at 336.
136. 16 U.S.C.S. §1533(f)(1) states,
... The Secretary, in developing and implementing recovery
plans shall, to the maximum extent practicable give priority
to those endangered species or threatened species. Without
regard to taxonomic classification most likely to benefit from
such plans, particularly those species that are, or may be, in
conflict with construction or other development projects or
other forms of economic activity.
In 1994, the Secretary's ability to give priority to the plans most likely
to contribute to the flourishing of a species was upheld in court. In Or-
egon Natural Resource Council v. Turner, 863 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Or. 1994),
the Secretary of the Interior was sued for failing to develop a recovery
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3. Section 7's requirement of public agency consultation
To ensure the federal government's cooperation with the aims
and purposes of the ESA, section 7 requires all federal agencies
to ensure that "any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
[an] agency . .. is not likely to jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any endangered species or threatened species or result
in the destruction or adverse modification of [the critical]
habitat of such species. ' 137 Thus, endangered and threatened
species are protected from the potential harm done by the enact-
ment of federal agencies' projects. The special requirement of
government agencies to ensure that their actions do not harm
listed species or their habitats is one of the most effective and
most controversial aspects of the ESA. 138
Before a federal agency can embark upon a new project, it
must engage in a process known as informal consultation. In this
process, the agency confers with the Secretary of the Interior to
determine whether the project area contains a listed species or
its critical habitat. 39 Should the Secretary determine that the
plan for an endangered plant species, claiming that this failure was a
violation of the ESA in that the Secretary failed to perform his duty.
The District Court decided against the plaintiffs noting that Congress
recognized that development of recovery plans for listed species would
take significant time and resources. It therefore provided in the ESA
that the Secretary could establish a priority system for developing and
implementing such plans. This priority system allows the Secretary
broad discretion to allocate scarce resources to those species that he or
she determines would most likely benefit from the development of a
recovery plan. Unlike other requirements under the ESA, such as the
designation of critical habitat, the statute places no time constraints on
the development of recovery plans. Id. at 1283 (citations omitted).
137. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(a) (2).
138. See James H. Bolin, Jr., Of Razorbacks and Reservoirs: The Endan-
gered Species Act's Protection of Endangered Colorado River Basin Fish, 11
PACE ENVrL. L. REv. 35, 45 (labeling Section 7 "the heart of the ESA");
Chris Woodley, The Sonoran Pronghorn: The Air Force's Strongest Adversary,
6 DIcK J. ENv. L. POL. 299 (noting that Section 7 has been the subject
of much litigation).
139. An informal consultation generally "involves an assessment of
the scope of the action, the affected area and the degree of impact
that the proposed project may. have on a listed species or its habitat."
Kubasek, supra note 119, at 21.
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area contains no listed species or critical habitat, the agency is
free to proceed with the project. If, on the other hand, the Sec-
retary determines that the area contains listed species or critical
habitat,140 the agency must prepare a biological assessment to de-
termine the likelihood that the agency's action will affect the
species. 141
A biological assessment is "information prepared by or under
the direction of the federal agency concerning listed and pro-
posed species and designated and proposed critical habitat that
may be present in the action area and the evaluation [of] poten-
tial effects of the action on such species and habitat.' ' 42 When
the biological assessment is completed, the agency submits it to
the Secretary, who seeks to determine whether the action will
likely jeopardize the species or habitat.143 This process is known
as formal consultation. 44 Within 90 days of receiving the biologi-
cal assessment, the Secretary issues a biological opinion expres-
sing his finding. 145
If the Secretary concludes that the action would jeopardize the
continued existence of the species, the opinion must include a
list of "reasonable and prudent alternatives"'146 that the agency
could perform to allow the project to continue and accommo-
date the listed species. Should the Secretary conclude that the
species is not in jeopardy, the agency may continue with its
project.
Despite providing for this elaborate process of consultation,
Congress did not make the opinion of the Secretary binding.
Even if the Secretary makes a finding of jeopardy in the formal
consultation process, the agency may ignore the Secretary's opin-
ion and proceed with its project, provided that it takes "alterna-
tive, reasonably adequate steps to insure the continued exis-
tence" 47 of the endangered or threatened species in question
140. Such a finding is called a preliminary finding of jeopardy.
141. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(c).
142. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1998).
143. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(a) (2).
144. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, cited in Kubasek, supra note 119.
145. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(b).
146. 50 C.ER. § 402.02 (1998).
147. Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 859 F.2d 651, 660 (9th Cir.
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and uses the "best scientific and commercial data available" 4 in
devising its course of action. Because the agency proposing the
project has the final say in its action, it also carries the ultimate
responsibility for ensuring that its action does not harm a listed
species.
Additionally, agencies, people requesting a license from an
agency, and governors of any affected states all have the option
of petitioning the Endangered Species Committee 149 for an ex-
emption. The exemption will be granted when five of the Com-
mittee's seven members find that:
(i) there are no' reasonable and prudent alternatives to the
agency action; (ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh
the benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with con-
serving the species or its critical habitat, and such action is in
the public interest; (iii) the action is of regional or national sig-
nificance; and (iv) neither the Federal agency concerned nor
the exemption applicant made any irreversible or irretrievable
commitment of resources [which would have the effect of fore-
closing the formulation of any reasonable alternative
measures]. 50
1988).
148. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(a) (2).
149. The Committee is established in 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(e). The
composition of the Committee is determined in subsection (3), which
states,
The Committee shall be composed of seven members as
follows:
A. The Secretary of Agriculture.
B. The Secretary of the Army.
C. The Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors.
D. The Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency.
E. The Secretary of the Interior.
F. The Administrator of the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration.
G. The President, after consideration of any recommen-
dations received . . . shall appoint one individual from each
affected State . ..
150. 16 U.S.C.S. § 1536(h) (1) (A).
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C. Current Implementation of the Act
In 1993, time ran out for the Endangered Species Act. That
year, a number of Bills designed to modify the ESA were intro-
duced in Congress. Unable to agree on a plan for reauthoriza-
tion, 51 Congress decided instead to fund the Act for an addi-
tional year and attempted to strike a compromise in 1994.
Although eleven different Bills were introduced in 1994,152 Con-
gress was still unable to come to an agreement. In response,
Congress repeated its action of the previous year, .and merely
funded the Act for another year.
The Republican Revolution of 1994 proved malignant to the
ESA. Expressing the voices of private property rights activists
across the nation, the Republicans made an assault on the ESA
part of their "Contract with America."' 53 The net result was the
passing of a one-year moratorium on the funding for the listing
of endangered and threatened species in 1995. The following
year, Congress chose not to impose another moratorium on
funding for species listing despite its continued inability to pass a
reauthorization Bill. 154
151. Reauthorization is the process by which the Act receives a
new five-year funding package. Amendments to the Act are not re-
quired in the reauthorization process, but changes are frequently made
during the process. See Katherine Bouma, Endangered Species Act Also
Struggling to Stay Alive; In Its 24 Years, the Law Has Been Altered and Weak-
ened. Wrangling in Congress is Expected to Continue This Year, THE ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Dec. 29, 1997, at A6.
152. See Kubasek, Browne, & Mohn-Klee, supra note 131, at 339-352
for a review of four of these Bills.
153. See Cushion, John H., Congressional Republicans Take Aim at an
Extensive List of Environmental Statutes, NY TIMES, February 22, 1995, at
14.
154. In the testimony against another moratorium, Senator Reid,
one of the initial co-sponsors of S. 1180, stated,
It is important that we understand that these are not
problems that we can go back and deal with later. Once
there is an extinction it is over with. It is over with for good.
To deny the Department of Interior the funds needed to en-
sure good science is to invoke a self-fulfilling prophecy of
the failure of this act. Extinction cannot be altered .... It is
permanent. That permanence should weigh heavily when we
consider our priorities.
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Today, the struggle for a new ESA continues in Congress, pri-
marily as a result of the growing forces of the Property First
Movement, which opposes restrictions regarding the use of their
property.55 This increase in the Property Firsters' power 5 6 has
had dire consequences for our legislature's ability to protect at-
risk wildlife by re-authorizing the ESA, and also on the execu-
tive's ability to enforce legislation designed to protect endan-
gered and threatened species.
The growing backlash'57 against the ESA has produced a dras-
141 Cong. Rec. S18602-01 (Dec. 14, 1995).
155. See Phelps, supra note 97, at 175, ("Two decades of strict judi-
cial enforcement of the ESA have built resistance from ranchers, devel-
opers, and private property rights advocates."). See also id. at n.3.
Property rights advocates are concerned that individual prop-
erty owners are having their land 'taken' by the government
in order to effectuate national policies intended to have a
collective benefit. They argue that if the collective good is to
be promoted through such restrictions, the cost of those re-
strictions ought to be underwritten by general tax revenue.
Such opinions are reflected by some conservative Senators. See, e.g., 143
Cong. Rec. 84214.
It is bad policy to require the American people to sacrifice
their constitutionally protected rights for any federal pro-
gram-even [the Endangered Species Act]. I would like to
see S. 1180 strengthen and protect the Fifth Amendment
right to compensation. I will vote for amendments and/or
legislation that strengthens our citizen's [sic] private prop-
erty rights. (statements of Sen. Craig).
156. See Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement: How It
Began and Where It Is Headed, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S' PROPERTY
RIGHTS REBELLION, 1-30 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995), for a discussion of
the origins of the property rights movement. Marzulla labels a reaction,
known as the "Sagebrush Rebellion," against a Department of the Inte-
rior moratorium on claiming desert land for farming as the roots of
the current property rights movement. Id. at 3. While Marzulla pin-
points the origin of the modern property rights movement only twenty
years ago, the individualistic liberal thought upon which it rests can be
traced back several centuries.
157. Court decisions that expanded the authority of the ESA by in-
creasing the breadth of illegal activities have been a primary source of
discontentment for property rights advocates, adding fuel to their fire.
The central issue in these cases is, "What activities are included under
section 9's prohibition against 'taking?' " The Supreme Court decision
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tic weakening of the Act's enforcement. 158 A major way in which
the Act has been weakened is by the increasing use of practices
that prevent the Act's full power from being exercised. For ex-
ample, in 1992, the practice of offering Candidate Conservation
Agreements ("CCAs") was reimplemented. 159 These agreements
allow states and private sector entities to take responsibility for
protecting species. 60 In return for their agreement to protect
candidate species, they are able to prevent the species from be-
ing listed.' 61 These agreements are enforceable only as contracts;
thus, a violation of a CCA is treated as a breach of contract, not
as a violation of the ESA. 162 The increasing use of these agree-
ments reflects a subtle shift from treating endangered species as
public goods, warranting extensive protection by the govern-
ment, toward treating them more like private goods.
Not only is ESA enforcement weakened by agreements de-
signed to prevent the listing of species, but the permits allowing
the destruction of listed species' habitats and "incidental taking"
of the species themselves have become more common, to the
detriment of protected plants and animals. Section 10 of the ESA
in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515
U.S. 687 (1995), held that the Secretary is within his authority under
the ESA in designating activities that significantly modify or degrade a
listed species' habitat as violations of the takings prohibition.
158. See Bouma, supra note 151, at A6 (labeling the weakening of
ESA enforcement in Florida "anything but subtle"). Bouma states that
the USFWS recently permitted homes to be built within 50 feet of a
bald eagle's nest and promised the developer that it would be free
from the threat of prosecution if the eagles were to perish. Addition-
ally, for the past ten years, no critical habitat has been designated in
the state of Florida. See id. But see John J. Fialka, Endangered Species Act,
Itself Endangered, May Have Found the Political Backing to Survive, WALL ST.
J., March 2, 1998, at A20 (arguing that the ESA "work[s] better" when
the USFWS "mak[es] deals that relax sections of the law").
159. See Martha F. Phelps, Candidate Conversation Agreements Under
the Endangered Species Act: Prospects and Perils of an Administrative Experi-
ment, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 175, 176 (1997).
160. Id. at 192.
161. See supra note 159.
162. See supra note 159, at 176-177. Phelps argues that the use of
CCAs violates Congressional intent in passing the ESA if not in the let-
ter of the law. Id. at 208-11.
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enables the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National
Marine Fisheries Service to issue permits for the "incidental tak-
ing" of listed species. 163 In order to obtain such a permit, a party
must implement a Habitat Conservation Plan ("HCP").164 HCPs
are plans that allow projects (e.g., construction) to cause harm
to an endangered species habitat, provided that the landowners
perform some action to make up for the damage done to the
habitat. 165
In the past, section 10 permits were very rarely approved. 66
However, this decade has witnessed the blossoming of the num-
ber of such permits issued. 167 It is disturbing that the government
agencies charged with protecting endangered species and their
habitats are permitting developers and landowners to destroy
such habitats. However, even more disquieting is the fact that
the agreements intended to avoid such damages are. character-
ized by a massive lack of information. 16
163. Incidental takings permits were incorporated into the ESA by
the 1982 amendments to the Act. Kimberly K Walley, Opinion: Surprises
Inherent in the No Surprises Policy, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Oct. 1996
at 8.
164. Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbit labels these HCPs a
"win-win" situation for environmentalists and landowners. B.J. Berg-
man, A Plan to Die For SIERRA, Nov. 1997, at 34. Others label it a "zero-
sum game." Id. at 35.
165. See Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Many Habitat Conservation Plans Found
to Lack Key Data, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, at F3.
166. Between 1983 and 1992, only fourteen such permits were
given. See Patrick Gallagher, Endangered Species Act Reforms Aid Landown-
ers, NATL. L. J., Sept. 29, 1997, at B9.
167. "From 1992 through June 1997, approximately 203 additional
permits . . .have been approved, and approximately 200 more are cur-
rently pending." Id.
168. See supra note 165, at F3. This article reports on a study on
HCPs performed by 119 scientists. The researchers found that "for the
vast majority of species, the crucial scientific data does not exist, mak-
ing reliable planning difficult or impossible .... Even the most basic
information, like life span, was lacking for a third of the species."
1999]
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VI. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR REAUTHORIZATION
Given the severe weakening of the ESA over the past ten years,
and the peril in which this situation has placed our endangered
species, it is imperative that Congress come to an agreement to
reauthorize the Act. Otherwise, the lack of reauthorization will
continue to be interpreted as lack of support for endangered
species. Consequently, imperiled species will begin to perish at
higher rates.
Currently, two proposals for ESA reauthorization are before
Congress. The following is a review of each Bill and its likely ef-
fects on the status of U.S. endangered species.
A. The Kempthorne Bill (S.1180)
Senate Bill 1180, an attempt to reauthorize the ESA, was intro-
duced on September 16, 1997.169 Sponsored by Senator Dirk
Kempthorne (R-ID), S.1180 ("Kempthorne Bill") seeks a middle
ground approach 170 to resolving the conflict between property
owners and environmentalists.17 ' The Bill won support quickly
169. The Kempthorne Bill, although recently introduced, was long
in the making.
The long and arduous effort culminating in today's Bill be-
gan more than 18 months ago, as a bipartisan process to ad-
dress the problems with the current law. When discusgions
stalled, Senator Kempthorne and I spurred the process for-
ward by releasing a discussion draft, which generated hun-
dreds of comments. Since then, we have negotiated with Sen-
ators Baucus and Reid, and the Clinton administration, to
reach agreement on a bipartisan Bill.
143 CONG. REC. S9422 (1997) (statements of Sen. Chaffee on Septem-
ber 16, 1997).
170. Senator Kempthorne stated, "The fact that we're being shot
at from both sides tells us we've found political balance." See Fialka,
supra note 158 at A20. See also Endangered Species; Contentious Law Should
Be Granted New Life, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, March 17, 1998, at 8A (prais-
ing the Kempthorne Bill's moderate approach).
171. "When we started [the process of drafting the Bill] over two
years ago, we asked ourselves the question: Should we make a con-
certed effort to save species? The answer was a resounding yes. But
could we do it without putting people and communities at risk? Again,
yes." Hearings on the Endangered Species Recovery Act S. 1180 Before the Sen-
ate Env't. and Pub. Works Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Sen.
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and was approved by the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee by a 15-3 vote on September 30, 1997.172 It was
amended and then reported on October 31, 1997.173
1. Description
The Kempthorne Bill alters the ESA in numerous ways, many
of which would lessen the protection given to an endangered
and threatened species. One major change would affect the en-
tire process of listing species, designating their critical habitats,
and developing and implementing recovery plans. In addition to
requiring that the Secretary make his judgments on the basis of
the "best scientific and commercial data available,"' 74 the
Kempthorne Bill gives priority to data that "is empirical or has
been field-tested or peer-reviewed." 75
The Kempthorne Bill also makes significant changes to the list-
ing process. It requires the Secretary to solicit the opinions of
state agencies whenever he receives a petition to list, delist, or
change the status of a species. 17 6 Additionally, it imposes a time
Kempthorne).
172. See Stephen Blakely, The Environment: Senate Action Expected on
Endangered Species Law, NATION'S BUSINESS, Dec. 1997.
173. See S. 1180, 105th Cong. (1997).
174. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
175. S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). This requirement of peer re-
view has been criticized by environmentalists, who are concerned that
it would slow the listing process. See Beth Baker, Washington Watch: En-
dangered Species Legislation, 47 BIOSCIENCE 733 (1997).
176. The Kempthorne Bill states,
Petitioned actions - If the petition is found to present the
[necessary information], the Secretary shall notify and pro-
vide a copy of the petition to the State agency -in each State
in which the species is believed to occur and solicit the as-
sessment of the agency, to be submitted to the Secretary not
later than 90 days after the notification, as to whether the
petitioned action is warranted. Id.
Some authorities in state agencies desire ESA legislation that
would give the states an even greater role in the listing process. See,
e.g., Hearings on the Endangered Species Recovery Act S. 1180 Before the Sen-
ate Env't. and Pub. Works Comm., 105th Cong. (1997).
We would urge you to consider directing the Secretary to
give greater weight to the recommendations of the State fish
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limit on the Secretary's final decision regarding such petitions. 177
The Kempthorne Bill also adds the introduction of other species
and competition among species to the criteria that the Secretary
may consider when deciding whether to list a species. 78
The Kempthorne Bill removes much of the ESA's protection
given to the habitat of listed species. It deletes the requirement
that the Secretary list critical habitat when a species is listed. 79
Instead, the Kempthorne Bill gives the Secretary 30 months from
the time of listing to list a species critical habitat, unless the spe-
cies has no recovery plan in place. °80 In such case, the Secretary
and wildlife agencies than in the existing language, which
simply calls for the Secretary to consider the States' recom-
mendations. We believe the State fish and wildlife agencies
have experience and expertise that the Secretary should avail
himself of as a first level of "peer review" of listing petitions.
Our preference is to give favor to the State recommenda-
tions in the form of a rebuttable presumption which the Sec-
retary can overturn, but we are also happy to work with staff
on other alternatives. (testimony of Duane L. Shroufe, Ari-
zona Game and Fish Department and Immediate Past Presi-
dent, International Association of Fish and Wildlife
Agencies).
177. The text of S. 1180 reads, "Not later than one year after re-
ceiving a petition that is found [under the relevant criteria] to present
substantial information indicating that the petitioned action may be
warranted, the Secretary shall [find the action either warranted, not
warranted, or warranted but precluded]." S. 1180, 105th Cong. sec. 2
(1997). Additionally, if a petition is found to be warranted or war-
ranted but precluded, that finding is subject to judicial review.
178. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
179. The Kempthorne Bill amends 16 U.S.C. 1533(a) by deleting
paragraph (3), which states,
The Secretary . . . to the maximum extent prudent and
determinable-
A. shall, concurrently with making a determination . . . that
a species is an endangered species or a threatened species,
designate any habitat of such species which is then consid-
ered to be critical habitat; and
B. may, from time-to-time thereafter as appropriate, revise
such designation.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1533(a) (3).
180. S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997).
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has three years, from the time of listing, to designate a species'
critical habitat. 181 Thus, it provides a gap of up to three years in
which an imperiled species' habitat has no protection
whatsoever. 8 2
181. Section 3 of S. 1180 reads:
A. Critical Habitat Designation.
B. Recommendation of the recovery team. - Not later than
nine months after the date of publication ... of a final regu-
lation containing a listing determination for a species, the re-
covery team appointed for the species shall provide the Sec-
retary with a description of any habitat of the species that is
recommended for designation as critical habitat ...
C. Designation by the Secretary. - The Secretary, to the
maximum extent prudent and determinable, shall by regula-
tion designate any habitat that is considered to be critical
habitat of an endangered species or a threatened species
that is indigenous to the United States or waters with respect
to which the United States exercises sovereign rights or
jurisdiction.
D. Designation.-
E. Proposal.-Not later than 18 months after the date on
which a final listing determination is made . . . for a species,
the. Secretary, after consultation and in cooperation with the
recovery team, shall publish in the Federal Register a pro-
posed regulation designating critical habitat for the species.
F. Promulgation.-The Secretary shall, after consultation and
in cooperation with the recovery team, publish a final regula-
tion designating critical habitat for a species not later than
30 months after the date on which a final listing determina-
tion is made . . . for the species.
G. Other designations.-If a recovery plan is not developed
under this section for an endangered species or a threatened
species, the Secretary shall publish a final critical habitat de-
termination for the endangered species or threatened spe-
cies not later than three years after making a determination
that the species is an endangered species or a threatened
species.
S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997).
182. However, the Secretary is given permission to designate a spe-
cies critical habitat at the time of listing "if the Secretary determines
that designation of such habitat at the time of listing is essential to
avoid the imminent extinction of the species." S. 1180.
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The Bill also weakens protection of critical habitat by allowing
the Secretary to consider economic factors when determining a
listed species' critical habitat."3 Additionally, it gives the Secre-
tary the power to exclude certain lands from being designated as
critical habitat'8 4 and provides for the revision of critical habitat.
Because the Bill provides for revision and directs the Secretary to
consider the economic impacts of a critical habitat designation,
an area of protected habitat may lose its designation (and there-
fore its protection) should the land become more valuable to
developers.
Delisting species is a focal point of the Kempthorne Bill. The
Bill requires the Secretary to initiate the delisting process once
the goals of a recovery plan are met.' To ensure that delisting
183. S. 1180 § 3 reads:
Factors to be considered-The designation of critical habitat
shall be made on the basis of the best scientific and commer-
cial data available and after taking into consideration the ec-
onomic impact, impacts to military training and operations,
and any other relevant impact, of specifying and particular
area as critical habitat. The Secretary shall describe the eco-
nomic impacts and other relevant impacts that are to be con-
sidered under this subsection in the publication of any pro-
posed regulation designating critical habitat.
S. 1180.
184. The text of S. 1180 reads:
A. Exclusions-The Secretary may exclude any area from
critical habitat for a species if the Secretary determines that
the benefits of the exclusion outweigh the benefits of
designating the area as part of the critical habitat, unless the
Secretary determines that the failure to designate the area as
critical habitat will result in the extinction of the species.
Id. This provision allows the Secretary to subordinate species recovery
to the interests of industry except in cases where the species will be-
come extinct without the Secretary's help. It therefore undermines the
goal of recovery by allowing actions that will harm endangered and
threatened species as long as they will not result in certain extinction.
185. The Kempthorne Bill states, "The Secretary shall, . . . on a
determination that the goals of the recovery plan for a species have
been met, initiate the procedures for determining .. .whether to re-
move the species from a list." S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). See Platt,
infra note 216, at 5 (arguing that this delisting requirement is evidence
of Sen. Kempthorne's intention for "the initial and final steps for im-
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decisions are made on sound reasons, the Secretary is directed
to obtain independent scientific review of the decision whenever
such a decision is to be made.8 6 However, the Secretary may ig-
nore the scientific opinion. 187 Thus, it gives the Secretary the
power to remove species from the list without insurance that the
removal is being made on scientific grounds.
plementifig the Act's objectives [to] become more transparent to the
public and, in the end, more equitable in their impacts").
1.86. Section 2 provides for independent scientific review, stating:
A. In general.-In the case of a regulation proposed by the
secretary to implement a determination .. . that any species
currently listed as an endangered species or a threatened
species should be removed from any list .... the Secretary
shall provide for independent scientific peer review by-
B. selecting independent referees pursuant to subparagraph
(B); and
C. requesting the referees to conduct the review; considering
all relevant information, and make a recommendation to the
Secretary in accordance with this paragraph not later than
150 days after the general notice is published [ ].
D. Selection of referees.-For each independent scientific re-
view to be conducted pursuant to subparagraph (A), the Sec-
retary shall select three independent referees from a list pro-
vided by the National Academy of Sciences, who-
E. through publication of peer-reviewed scientific literature
or other means, have demonstrated scientific expertise on
the species or a similar species or other scientific expertise
relevant to the decision of the Secretary.
F. do not have, or represent any person with, a conflict of in-
terest with respect to the determination that is the subject of
the review; and
G. are not participants in a petition to list, change the status
of, or remove the species .... the assessment of a State for
the species ...or the proposed or final determination of
the Secretary.
S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
187. The Kempthorne Bill states that the Secretary is to give a de-
cision within a year of the time that the proposal to delist a species is
issued. It provides, "[I] n a case in which the recommendation of a ma-
jority of the referees who conducted the independent scientific re-
view ...is not followed, [the Secretary is to issue] an explanation as
to why the recommendation was not followed." Id. at § 3.
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In addition to changing the ESA's listing and delisting
processes, the Kempthorne Bill overhauls the design and imple-
mentation of recovery plans. 88 In most instances, the changes
made by the Bill expand the bureaucracy associated with recov-
ery plans. For instance, when a species is listed, the Bill requires
the Secretary to publish a description of information that would
aid in developing a recovery plan for that species.18 9 When plans
are developed, the Secretary is to rank the alternative plans. In
addition to prioritizing plans that will provide for the preserva-
tion of multiple species, that will have the greatest likelihood of
success, and that will address the needs of the species most at
risk, the Bill requires the Secretary to give priority to plans that
"reduce conflicts with construction, development projects, jobs,
private property, or other economic activities." 190
The Bill imposes temporal guidelines on the development of
recovery plans, requiring the Secretary to publish a draft recov-
ery plan within 18 months of the species' listing and a final re-
188. In regard to the ESA's current provisions for recovery plans,
Sen. Kempthorne stated,
There are over a thousand species on the endangered spe-
cies list, but fewer than one half of them have recovery plans
and many of those plans have never been implemented. The
best evidence that the current law isn't working may be the
fact that not a single species has recovered as a result of a re-
covery plan.
143 CONG. REC. 89412 (1997).
Sen. Kempthorne also stated, "The Bill will add teeth to the recov-
ery planning process so that we're no longer just running an endan-
gered species emergency room without also providing the prescription
for recovery." Id.
189. Section 2 of S. 1180 states:
In general-The Secretary shall identify and publish in the
Federal Register with the notice of a proposed regulation...
a description of additional scientific and commercial data
that would assist in the preparation of a recovery plan and-
A. invite any person to submit the data to the Secretary; and
B. describe the stops that the Secretary plans to take for ac-
quiring additional data.
S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
190. S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997).
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covery plan within 30 months.19' However, because it lacks a
clause mandating the development of recovery plans, imposing
such deadlines may actually discourage the Secretary from devel-
oping recovery plans for imperiled species. In this sense, the
message that the Kempthorne Bill sends is, "better never than
late."
Additionally, the Bill requires each recovery plan to include
specific sections. First, each plan must include a recovery goal
that, when met, would allow a listed species to be delisted. These
recovery goals must be peer-reviewed. 92 Second, the plan must
specify recovery measures that will be taken to further the recov-
ery of a species. Such measures may consist of:
(i) actions to protect and restore habitat;
(ii) research;
(iii) establishment of refugia, captive breeding, and releases
of experimental populations;
(iv) actions that may be taken by federal agencies, including
actions that use, in the maximum extent practicable, federal
lands; and
(v) opportunities to cooperate with state and local govern-
ments and other persons to recover species, including through
the development and implementation of conservation plans.193
Finally, recovery plans must include "objective, measurable
191. Id.
192. The Kempthorne Bill states:
A. In general.-Not later than 180 days after the appoint-
ment of a recovery team under this section, those members
of the recovery team with relevant scientific expertise shall
establish and submit to the Secretary a recommended biolog-
ical recovery goal to conserve and recover the species that,
when met, would result in the determination ...that the
species be removed from the list. The goal shall be based
solely on the best scientific and commercial data available.
The recovery goal shall be expressed as objective and mea-
surable biological criteria. When the goal is met, the Secre-
tary shall initiate the procedures for determining
whether ...to remove the species from the list.
B. Peer review.-The recovery team shall promptly obtain in-
dependent scientific review of the recommended biological
recovery goal.
Id.
193. Id.
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benchmarks" 94 to measure the recovery plan's success over time,
as well as a list of Federal agencies that "authorize, fund, or
carry out actions that are likely to have a significant impact on
recovery of the species."' 195
Anytime the Secretary makes a preliminary determination that
a draft recovery plan should be implemented, he is required to
request public comment on the plan and its economic effects by
publishing the plan and the request in the Federal Register. 96
Additionally, the Secretary is required to hold a public hearing
in states that would be affected by the plan if any person re-
quests such a hearing. 97 If the plan is adopted, the Bill requires
that it be reviewed every ten years. 198
The Kempthorne Bill also seeks to ensure the development of
recovery plans for species currently listed, but lacking a recovery
plan. It requires the Secretary to designate recovery plans for at
least half of such species within 36 months of the Bill's passing
and for all such species within five years. 199
While the Kempthorne Bill seemingly seeks to aid species con-
servation efforts, the enormous bureaucracy associated with en-
suring that all the additional requirements are carried out will
likely slow the process of developing recovery plans. This retarda-
tion, combined with the time limits on developing plans and the
lack of any requirement that recovery plans be developed, raises
the likely supposition that S. 1180 will make developing recovery
plans more difficult for the Secretary. Moreover, it includes pro-
visions that directly further the interests of property rights advo-
cates. A major property rights provision of the Bill is that it per-
mits the Secretary to compensate private landowners who carry
out recovery plans.100
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. The Bill limits the total number of hearings to five. See id.
198. The Bill also requires that existing plans be reviewed within
five years of the Bill's passing. See id.
199. See id.
200. The Kempthorne Bill states,
Financial assistance-
(i) In general-In cooperation with the States and subject to
the availability of appropriations, the Secretary may provide a
grant of up to $25,000 to a private landowner to assist the
landowner in carrying out a recovery plan implementation
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In addition to compensating landowners who are affected by
recovery plans, the Bill also includes private property-friendly
provisions for people who enter into conservation plans with the
government. It leaves intact the original ESA's requirement that
in order for the Secretary to issue a takings permit, the other
party must agree to implement a conservation plan.20 While the
Bill offers some provisions that would help endangered species,
such as requiring that agreements not contribute to the eventual
endangering of non-listed species, 2 2 it also makes several major
agreement under this subsection.
(ii) Prohibition on assistance for required activities.-The
Secretary may not provide assistance under this paragraph
for any action that is required by a permit issued under this
Act or that is otherwise require under this Act or other Fed-
eral law.
Id.
Kempthorne included this provision because he feels, "[t]he ESA
must provide more incentives-more carrots and fewer sticks-to en-
courage property owners to become partners in the conservation of
our rare and unique species." Hearings on the Endangered Species Recovery
Act S. 1180 Before the Senate Env't. and Pub. Works Comm., 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Sen. Kempthorne).
201. The ESA states,
No permit may be issued by the Secretary authorizing'
any taking [of a listed species] unless the applicant therefor
submits to the Secretary a conservation plan that specifies-
(i) the impact which will likely result from such a taking;
(ii) what steps the applicant will take to minimize and miti-
gate such impacts, and the funding that will be available to
implement such steps;
(iii) what alternative actions to such taking the applicant
considered and the reasons why such alternatives are not be-
ing utilized; and such other measures that the Secretary may
require as being necessary or appropriate for purposes of the
plan.
16 U.S.C.S. § 1539(a) (2) (A) (1998).
202. S. 1180 states the criteria that a conservation plan must satisfy
in order for the Secretary to approve it:
(i) the actions taken by the applicant with respect to species
proposed for listing or candidates for listing included in the
plan, if undertaken by all similarly situated persons within
the range of such species are likely to eliminate the need to
list the species as an endangered species or a threatened spe-
cies for the duration of the agreement as a result of the ac-
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concessions to private property owners.
One of the most controversial provisions of the Kempthorne
Bill is the "no surprises" clause. 20 3 This provision requires each
conservation plan to include a clause that allows the permittee to
avoid any future costs and any additional restrictions on land
use.204 Thus, even if an endangered species that occupied a per-
tivities conducted by those persons;
(ii) the actions taken by the applicant with respect to other
non-listed species included in the plan, if undertaken by all
similarly situated persons with the range of such species,
would not be likely to contribute to list the species as an en-
dangered species or a threatened species for the duration of
the agreement[.]
S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997).
203. For a general criticism of the "no surprises" policy, see Kim-
berley K. Walley, Opinion: Surprises Inherent in the No Surprises Policy, EN-
DANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Oct. 1996, at 5. Walley states that some of
the world's premier conservation biologists have voiced opposition to
the no surprises policy. See id. at 5.
204. The "no surprises" clause states,
(i) In general.-Each conservation plan developed under
this subsection shall include a no surprises provision, as de-
scribed in this paragraph.
(ii) No surprises.-A person who has entered into, and is in
compliance with, a conservation plan under this subsection
may not be required to undertake any additional mitigation
measures for species covered by such plan if such measures
would require the payment of additional money, or the
adoption of additional use, development, or management re-
strictions on any land, waters, or water-related rights that
would otherwise be available under the terms of the plan
without the consent of the permittee. The Secretary and the
applicant, by the terms of the conservation plan, shall
identify-
(iii) other modifications to the plan; or
(iv) other additional measures; if any, that the Secretary may
require under extraordinary circumstances.
S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997). This clause essentially gives property
owners the option of whether to protect at-risk species when circum-
stances for that species change.
Since 1994, the USFWS and NMFS have exercised a "no surprises
policy," but the policy is not codified in the ESA. See Kimberley K Wal-
ley, supra note 203, at 8; Fialka, supra note 158 (reporting that Sec.
Babbitt supports the use of a no surprises policy).
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mittee's property teetered on the brink of extinction, the govern-
ment could not require the property owner to undertake mea-
sures outside the original conservation plan in order to ensure
the survival of that species. Furthermore, if a previously unlisted
species on a permit recipient's land becomes listed, that property
owner cannot be required to take additional steps to protect that
species. Similar assurances are granted to property owners who
enter into Candidate Conservation Agreements ("CCAs").20 This
provision is not an example of using market forces to help pro-
tect the environment, but rather it is an illustration of allowing
market forces to determine the matters best left to the political
process.
This policy was included to "giv[e] landowners certainty that their
obligations will be defined by the [conservation plan into which they
enter]." 143 CONG. REG. 89412 (1997) (statements of Sen.
Kempthorne). However, it may amount to a massive reduction in spe-
cies protection. See S. REP. No. 105-128, at 59-60 (1997). "No surprises"
is particularly troubling given the fact that HCP agreements cover not
only listed species for which we would have sound scientific data, but
also candidate and other unlisted species for which we may have little
scientific information .... In the Kempthorne Bill HCPs have neither a
clear recovery standard nor assured funding. "No surprises" could
therefore spell disaster in cases where an HCP hurts species recovery, is
nonfunctional, or is rendered inadequate given new science. Id. (state-
ments of Sen. Boxer).
205. The Kempthorne Bill states,
(i) Assurances-A person who has entered into a candidate
conservation agreement . . . and is in compliance with the
agreement, may not be required to undertake any additional
measures for species covered by such agreement if the mea-
sures would require the payment of additional money, or the
adoption of additional use, development, or management re-
strictions on any land, waters, or water-related rights that
would otherwise be available under the terms of the agree-
ment without the consent of the person entering into the
agreement. The Secretary and the person entering into a
candidate conservation agreement, by the terms of the agree-
ment, shall identify-
(ii) other modifications to the agreement; or
(iii) other additional measures; if any, that the Secretary may
require under extraordinary circumstances.
S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997). See id. supra, Part II.C. for a discussion
of CCAs.
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Another element of the Kempthorne Bill that furthers the
rights of property owners at the expense of species in jeopardy is
its addition of "safe harbor agreements." 20 6 Such agreements al-
low property owners who enter into such agreements to engage
in unlawful takings of the species, provided that the takings fall
within requirements developed by the Secretary and the property
owner.20 7 Additionally, the Kempthorne Bill permits the Secretary
206. The Bill provides,
In general.-The Secretary may enter into agreements with
non-Federal persons to benefit the conservation of endan-
gered species or threatened species by creating, restoring, or
improving habitat or by maintaining currently unoccupied
habitat for endangered species or threatened species. Under
an agreement, the Secretary shall permit the person to take
endangered species or threatened species included under
the agreement on lands or waters that are subject to the
agreement if the taking is incidental to, and not the purpose
of, carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity, except that
the Secretary may not permit through an agreement any in-
cidental taking below the baseline requirement specified pur-
suant to [the following subparagraph.]
Id.
Safe harbor agreements are currently implemented, but they are
not codified in the ESA. See Fialka, supra note 158 (describing a safe
harbor agreement in the Carolinas designed to protect the Red Cock-
aded Woodpecker). The' reason for implementing safe harbor agree-
ments is to rid property owners of the fear that if endangered species
inhabit their land, then they will not be able to use the property as
they had intended. Such fear may prompt some property owners to
"destroy potential habitat in order to avoid attracting listed species....
[However], safe harbor agreements . . . provide some degree of cer-
tainty that [property owners] will be able to use their property in the
future consistent with the terms of the agreements." See S. REP. No.
105-128, at 35 (1997).
207. The baseline requirements for such actions are as follows:
Baseline-For each agreement under this subsection, the
Secretary shall establish a baseline requirement that is mutu-
ally agreed upon by the applicant and the Secretary at the
time of the agreement that will, at a minimum, maintain ex-
isting conditions for the species covered by the agreement
on lands and waters that are subject to the agreement. The
baseline may be expressed in terms of the abundance or dis-
tribution of endangered or threatened species, quantity or
quality of habitat, or such other indicators as appropriate.
[Vol. X
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to compensate landowners who enter into such agreements. 2°
The Bill also provides for agreements, 20 9 whereby a non-
Federal landowner and the Secretary may enter into a contract
"to protect, manage, or enhance suitable habitat on private prop-
erty for the benefit of endangered species or threatened spe-
cies." 210 The landowner in such an agreement receives payments
from the government for carrying out the terms of the
agreement.21'
While the Kempthorne Bill certainly expands the rights of pri-
vate property owners, it also hinders the Secretary's ability to
protect species and their habitat. Rather than having the Secre-
tary determine which actions by Federal agencies are likely to
have an adverse affect on listed species, the Bill leaves that task
up to the heads of the agencies themselves and gives the Secre-
S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997). By allowing the existing conditions for
the species to qualify as the baseline requirement, this provision serves
to reinforce the status quo and to allow imperiled species to remain
imperiled, rather than to promote the recovery of the species.
208. The Kempthorne Bill states,
(i) Financial assistance.-
(ii) In general.-In cooperation with the States and subject
to the availability of appropriations. . . . the Secretary may
provide a grant of up to $10,000 to any individual private
landowner to assist the landowner in carrying out a safe har-
bor agreement under this subsection.
(iii) Prohibition on assistance for required activities.-The
Secretary may not provide assistance under this paragraph
for any action that is required by a permit issued under this
Act or that is otherwise required under this Act of other Fed-
eral law.
S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997).
209. Such agreements are called "habitat reserve agreements."
"The purpose of these habitat reserve agreements is to encourage
small property owners, particularly farmers and small woodlot owners,
many of whom have suitable habitat for a listed species, to manage that
habitat to benefit the species. Many of these property owners want to
preserve or enhance habitat for species on their property, but they sim-
ply cannot afford to do so." S. REP. No. 105-128 at 36, (1997).
210. S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997).
211. The Bill does not mandate the amount of the payments. In-
stead, the payments are to be in an amount agreed upon by the Secre-
tary and the party who entered into the agreement. Id.
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tary 60 days to object to the agency's findings.212 By reducing the
Secretary's role in the consultation process, it weakens the power
of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") and
the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") to halt federal
actions that will result in harm to listed species and their habitat.
Finally, the Kempthorne Bill lessens the ESA's protection of
endangered and threatened species by weakening the enforce-
ment of the statute by raising the burden of proof in suits
against violators. It requires the party bringing the suit (the Sec-
212. The Kempthorne Bill strikes the following provision from the
ESA:
Subject to such guidelines as the Secretary may establish, a
Federal agency shall consult with the Secretary on any pro-
spective agency action at the requires of, and in cooperation
with, the prospective permit or license applicant if the appli-
cant has reason to believe that an endangered species may
be present in the area affected by his project and that imple-
mentation of such action will likely affect such species.
16 USCS § 1536(a) (3) (1998).
In its place, the Bill provides the following:
(i) Consultation.-
(ii) Notification of actions.-Prior to commencing any ac-
tion, each Federal agency shall notify the Secretary if the
agency determines that the action may affect an endangered
species or a threatened species, or critical habitat.
(iii) Agency determination.-
(iv) In general-Each Federal agency shall consult with the
Secretary as required . . . on each action for which notifica-
tion is required under subparagraph (A) unless-
(v) the Federal agency makes a determination based on the
opinion of a qualified biologist that the action is not likely to
adversely affect an endangered species, a threatened species,
or critical habitat;
(vi) the Federal agency notifies the Secretary that it has de-
termined that the action is not likely to adversely" affect any
listed species or critical habitat and provides the Secretary,
along with the notice, a copy of the information on which
the agency based the determination; and
(vii) the Secretary does not object in writing to the agency's
determination within 60 days after the date such notice is
received.
S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997).
The stated purpose of this alteration of the ESA is to streamline
the consultation process. See 143 Cong. Rec. § 9422 (1997).
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retary, the Attorney General, or a private party bringing suit
under the ESA's provision for citizen suits) 21 3 to "establish, using
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles, that
the acts of such person have caused or will cause"214 the taking
of an endangered or threatened species. This requirement will
weaken the ESA's protection of critical habitat by requiring that
an act damaging such habitat must be scientifically linked to the
taking of a species in order for the act to qualify as a violation of
the ESA.2
15
The Kempthorne Bill has received widespread acclaim from in-
dustry groups. For example, the National Association of Home
Builders, the National Realty Committee, and various timber as-
sociations have voiced support of the S. 1180.216 More impor-
tantly, it has received support from the Clinton Administration,
including Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt.21 7 Surprisingly,
the amount of support that it has received from private property
rights advocates has been limited.28
213. See 16 USCS § 1540(g)(1 998).
214. S. 1180, 105th Cong. § 6 (1997).
215. Sen. Kempthorne stated,
Under the law today, the Government and environmental
groups have used the take prohibition to try to prohibit log-
ging and development on private lands and a city's pumping
of an aquifer for drinking water, even where there was no
scientific evidence that the activity would in fact harm an en-
dangered species. Our Bill will change that, reaffirming that
the Federal Government, or an environmental group, has
the burden of demonstrating that an activity will actually
harm a species and they must meet that burden using real
science, not just assumptions or speculation.
143 CONG. REC. S9412 (1997).
216. See Roger Platt, Ships Passing in the Night: Current Proposals for
Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act, ENDANGERED SPECIES UP-
DATE, Nov. 1997, at 6.
217. "The Clinton Administration supports the measure largely be-
cause it would codify much of the 10-point reform plan initiated by In-
terior Secretary Babbitt early in 1995." Id. at 5.
218. Id. The author attributes this lack of support to the Bills lack
of "a single provision directly aimed at protecting property rights." Id.
at 6. Kempthorne's colleagues in the Senate have also voiced such con-
cerns. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. S 4214
I am very concerned about what the [Kempthorne] Bill will
fail to do in the area of protecting private property rights.
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The Kempthorne Bill has been met with widespread disap-
proval from environmental groups.219 Many strongly oppose the
"no surprises" clause because it could freeze Habitat Conserva-
tion Plans ("HCPs") for up to 100 years. 220
Unfortunately, the Bill has much greater prospects for survival
than its alternative. It has been gathering support in the Senate.
When the Kempthorne Bill was first introduced, it had only
three cosponsors.22 1 Since that time, however, 13 others have cos-
ponsored the Bill.2 22 The Bill is likely to enjoy substantial support
This is no small matter. The right to own and use property
goes to the very heart of our American democracy. It was so
important to our founding fathers that they enshrined the
protection of private property in the Constitution's Bill of
Rights. (statements of Sen. Craig).
219. See, e.g., Alison Rolfe, For San Diego Species, Extinction is Forever,
THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., March 27, 1998, at B7 ("It is not a handful
of extremists who oppose the Kempthorne Bill and the policies it seeks
to codify, but rather, a sweeping majority of conservationists, scientists,
and the public."). Additionally, many religious organizations have
voiced opposition of the Kempthorne Bill. See, e.g., Hearing on the En-
dangered Species Recovery Act S. 1180 Before the Senate Env't. and Pub. Works
Comm., 105th Cong. (1997). "The Senate Endangered Species Recovery
Act of 1997 as currently proposed may, in many cases, risk species re-
covery, and the common good of the community in favor of short term
economic interests." (testimony submitted by The Coalition on the En-
vironment and Jewish Life, The Jewish Council for Public Affairs and
the Union of American Hebrew Congregations).
220. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act Needs Sensible Revision, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., April 17, 1998, at A26 ("The [Kempthorne] Bill would lock in
[HCPs] for up to 100 years-even if further scientific research shows
that the plan is inadequate to protect a certain species."); Endangered
Species Act Safe After 25 Years, The Baltimore Sun, May 29, 1998, at A23.
"[A] troublesome "No Surprise Rule" could effectively freeze . . . HCPs
for as long as 100 years. In trying to protect the owner from constant
federal meddling, the [Kempthorne] Bill goes too far." Id.
See also, Walley, supra note 203, at 14 (arguing that, by requiring a
no surprises clause in every HCP, the no-surprises policy removes the
public's ability to comment on the benefit of a no surprises clause in
an HCP and takes a valuable bargaining tool away from the agencies
responsible for overseeing HCPs).
221. Sen. Chaffee (R-RI), Sen. Baucus (D-MT), and Sen. Reid (D-
NV) are the initial cosponsors of S. 1180.
222. These Senators are Sen. Stevens (R-AK), Sen. Gordon Smith
(R-OR), Sen. Bennett (R-UT), Sen. Coverdell (R-GA), Sen. Murkowski
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from the Republican majority in the Senate. Additionally, the
support of the Clinton Administration may garner enough sup-
port from fellow Democrats to pass it through the Senate.
23
B. The Miller Bill (H.R.2351)
On July 31, 1997, Representative George Miller (D-CA) 224 intro-
duced an ESA reauthorization Bill to counter the private prop-
erty rights movement's attempts to rewrite the ESA. His Bill,
House Bill 2351 (hereinafter, the "Miller Bill"), also seeks to
strike a balance between environmental and property interests.
225
However, the Miller Bill gives priority to at-risk species and em-
phasizes recovery instead of economic interests. 226 It improves the
existing ESA by fixing the loopholes that undermine the recov-
ery of listed species. 227
(R-AK), Sen. Faircloth (R-NC), Sen. Bob Smith (R-NH), Sen. Campbell
(R-CO), Sen. Thomas (R-WY), Sen. Helms (R-NC), Sen. Mack (R-FL),
Sen. Craig (R-ID), and Sen. McConnell (R-KY).
223. However, the Kempthorne Bill may not be as well received in
the House. See Fialka, supra note 158, (stating that the Kempthorne Bill
is likely to enjoy less support in the House "where opposing groups are
more entrenched.")
224. Rep. Miller is "an established and respected player on ESA is-
sues and ranking Democrat on the House Resources Committee." See
Platt, supra note 216, at 4.
225. In his introduction of the Bill, Miller stated, "My hope is that
we have learned our lessons, that we recognize that landowners and
businesses have legitimate concerns that must be addressed, and that
the ESA is a law that is invaluable to our country and its future." 143
CONG. REC. E1595 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1997) (statement of Rep. Miller).
226. Miller stated,
The single most important change this Bill would make to
existing law is to ensure that all our actions under the ESA-
Federal actions or the actions of private landowners-do not
undermine the recovery of a species. Recovery and delisting
should be the standard we use for permitting incidental
takes, approving habitat conservation plans, and allowing
Federal actions to go forward.
Id.
227. See Beth Baker, Washington Watch: Endangered Species Legislation,
47 BIOSCIENCE 733 (1997). John Kostyak, counsel for the National Wild-
life Federation stated, "Currently, projects get approved even if they
would undermine recovery of a species. The Kempthorne Bill would
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The pro-recovery flavor of the Miller Bill is evident from its
stated purpose. By subordinating the assurance of property rights
to the guarantee of protecting biodiversity, Miller makes clear his
intent to place the interests of species protection above those of
economic development. 228 Additionally, the Bill's "Findings" sec-
tion recognizes the importance of maintaining biodiversity as
well as our nation's failure to do so. 229 The findings demonstrate
the Bill's commitment to preserving biological diversity in the
United States and to halting those activities that undermine this
goal.2 30
exacerbate this problem by adding new regulatory loopholes, and the
Miller Bill would attempt to fix it." Id.
228. The Miller Bill was introduced,
[t]o amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to en-
sure the recovery of our Nation's declining biological diver-
sity; to reaffirm and strengthen this Nation's commitment to
protect wildlife; to safeguard our children's economic and
ecological future; and to provide assurances to local govern-
ments, communities, and individuals in their planning and
economic development efforts.
H.R. 2351, 105th Cong. (1997).
229. H.R. 2351 §2 105th Cong. (1997).
230. Section 2 of H.R. 2351 states,
The Congress finds and declares the following:
(1) The American public recognizes the importance of pro-
tecting the natural environmental legacy of this Nation.
(2) It is only through the protection of all species of plants
and animals and the ecosystems upon which they depend
that we will conserve a world for our children with the spiri-
tual, medicinal, agricultural, and economic benefits that
plants and animals offer. Moreover, we have a moral respon-
sibility not to drive other species to extinction.
(3) We are rapidly proceeding in a manner that will deny a
world of abundant, varied species to future generations.
(4) Although the Endangered Species Act of 1973 has pre-
vented the extinction of many animal, plant, and fish spe-
cies, many of these species have not fully recovered and the
Act must ensure their long-term survival and recovery.
(5) Federal agencies and others should act to protect declin-
ing species before they need the full application of the En-
dangered Species Act of 1973.
(6) All members of the public have a right to be involved in
the decisions made to protect biodiversity.
[Vol. X
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The Miller Bill puts its support of species into practice in sev-
eral ways. A significant way in which the Bill enhances the ex-
isting ESA is that it improves the system by which listed species'
habitat is protected. Under the current system, the Secretary fre-
quently fails to list critical habitat for protected species. 231 The
Miller Bill seeks to alleviate this problem by requiring the Secre-
tary to designate critical habitat when a species' recovery plan is
adopted. 232 Because it requires a recovery plan to be drafted
within 18 months of a species' listing and adopted within 30
months of listing, 233 the designation of critical habitat is linked to
temporal deadlines. Such deadlines ensure that the Secretary will
fulfill his obligation to designate critical habitat for listed species.
Furthermore, the Miller Bill requires the Secretary to desig-
(7) To avoid extinction in the wild, habitats must be con-
served by using the best available science.
(8) Only by taking actions that implement the existing re-
covery goal of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 can we
ensure that species will eventually be removed from the lists
of endangered species and threatened species.
(9) We can provide assurances for communities, local gov-
ernments, and private landowners that will enable them to
move forward with planning and economic development ef-
forts while still protecting species.
H.R. 2351, § 2.
231. See Spotted Owl, supra note 128.
232. H.R. 2351, states, "The Secretary . . . shall concurrently with
adoption of the final recovery plan for a species . . . designate critical
habitat of the species." H.R. 2351, § 102.
233. The Miller Bill amends 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) to state,
The Secretary shall within 18 months after the date of
the adding of a species to a list under subsection (c), de-
velop a draft plan, and within 30 months after that date, de-
velop and begin implementation of a final plan (hereinafter
in this subsection referred to as "recovery plans") for the
conservation and survival for each endangered species and
threatened species listed pursuant to this section [.]
H.R. 2351, § 105.
This amendment strikes the phrase, ". . . unless [the Secretary]
finds that such plan will not promote the conservation of the species."
16 U.S.C.S. § 1533(f)(1). This phrase currently enables the Secretary to
dodge his duty to implement recovery plans.
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nate "interim habitat 23 4 for a species at the time it is listed.235
This listing of interim habitat ensures that a listed species'
habitat will not be damaged in the time between its listing and
the designation of its critical habitat. Additionally, the Secretary
is not to consider economic factors in making a designation of
interim habitat.236 Thus, the Bill recognizes that protection of
species' habitat is a task that cannot be left to the market.
The Miller Bill also includes provisions to strengthen recovery
plans. In addition to imposing a deadline for the drafting and
implementation of recovery plans237 and deleting the clause that
allowed the Secretary to refuse to implement a recovery plan,23
it also lists elements that each recovery plan must include. The
Miller Bill requires that each recovery plan include
(i) a description of such site-specific management actions,
noting those of the highest priority and greatest recovery po-
tential, as may be necessary to achieve the plan's goal for the
recovery of the species;
(ii) objective, measurable criteria, including habitat needs
and population levels, that, when met, would result in a deter-
mination, in accordance with the provisions of this section, that
the species be removed from the list;
(iii) estimates of the time required and the cost to carry out
this measure needed to achieve the plan's goal and to achieve
intermediate steps toward that goal;
. (iv) a general description of types of actions likely to violate
the taking prohibition of section 9 or the jeopardy prohibition
of section 7; and
(v) a list of Federal agencies, States, tribes, and local govern-
ment entities significantly affected by the goals or management
actions set forth in the recovery plan, that should complete a
234. "The term 'interim habitat' includes the habitat necessary to
support either current populations of a species or populations which
are necessary to ensure survival, whichever is larger." H.R. 2351, § 101.
235. H.R. 2351, § 102 states, "The Secretary ... shall, concurrently
with making a determination . . . that a species is an endangered spe-
cies or threatened species, designate interim habitat of the species."
236. See H.R. 2351, § 102. "The Secretary shall designate interim
habitat of a species based only on biological factors, giving special con-
sideration to habitat that is currently occupied by the species."
237. Id.
238. Id.
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recovery implementation plan []239
Because the Bill requires such specific information be in-
cluded in recovery plans, the Secretary will be better able to se-
lect the plan most likely to help the species in question when he
is forced to choose among several recovery plan proposals. Addi-
tionally, item (iv) provides for a proactive approach to conserv-
ing species and their habitat. By announcing which actions vio-
late the taking and jeopardy prohibitions, people will be able to
avoid engaging in such actions. This system is certainly an im-
provement over the current method, which waits until an action
harms a listed species, and then seeks to punish the perpetrators.
The Miller Bill also protects species by requiring that the
heads of federal agencies monitor listed species and candidate
species on land or in water under their control.240 It makes spe-
cial provisions for protecting listed marine mammals. More spe-
cifically, it requires that when incidental takings permits are is-
sued for listed marine mammals, the Federal agencies to which
the permits are issued must report the number of the species
taken to the Secretary every two years. 241 This requirement en-
ables the Services to ensure that agencies stay within the scope of
their permits.242
Miller's Bill also makes the criteria for issuing an incidental
takings permit more stringent. In order for a permit to be is-
sued, the applicant must demonstrate that the activities allowed
by the permit "are consistent with the recovery of the species
and will result in no net loss of the value to the species of the
habitat occupied by the species. ' 243 In addition, the applicant
must also submit a conservation plan to the secretary2" and pro-
239. H.R. 2351, § 105.
240. See H.R. 2351, § 107.
241. The Miller Bill,
directs the Federal agency [with a permit] to assess and re-
port to the Secretary two years after the date of issuance of
the written statement and every two years thereafter for as
long as any incidental take continues, the amount of inciden-
tal take that has occurred as a direct impact, indirect impact,
or cumulative impact.
Id.
242. Id. Should an agency exceed the number of takings permit-
ted, it must return to consultation.
243. H.R. 2351, § 8.
244. The Miller Bill requires a conservation plan to specify,
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vide "evidence of financial security to ensure adequate funding
for each element of the conservation plan." 24 Finally, permittees
are required to report to the Secretary annually. These reports
must provide evidence "on the biological status of the species in
the affected area, the impacts of the habitat conservation plan
and the permitted action upon the species, and whether the bio-
(i) A description of the specific activities sought to be au-
thorized by the permit.
(ii) A description and analysis of a reasonable range of alter-
native actions to the taking of each species covered by the
plan.
(iii) The individual and cumulative impacts that may reason-
ably be anticipated to result from the permitted activities cov-
ered by the plan, including the impacts of modification or
destruction of habitat of species authorized to be taken
under the permit.
(iv) Objective, measurable biological goals to be achieved for
each species covered by the plan.
(v) The conservation measures the applicant will implement
to minimize and mitigate the impacts specified under clause
(iii), including-
(i) the specific conservation measures for achieving the
biological goals of the plan; and
(ii) any additional requirements or restrictions or other
adaptive management provisions that are necessary to
respond to all reasonably foreseeable changes in cir-
cumstances that would jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any species covered by the plan, including but
not limited to new scientific information and changing
environmental conditions, including natural disasters.
(vi) The reasonably anticipated costs of the measures speci-
fied under clause (v).
(vii) Measures the applicant will take to monitor the effec-
tiveness of the plan's conservation measures in achieving the
plan's biological goals and impacts on recovery of each
species.
(viii) Funding that will be available to the applicant,
throughout the term of the plan, to implement the plan, in-
cluding but not limited to the conservation measures speci-
fied in the plan.
(ix) Such other matters as the Secretary determines to be
necessary or appropriate for purposes of the plan.
Id.
245. Id.
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logical goals of the plan are being met. 246
In contrast to the Kempthorne Bill's attempt to further prop-
erty rights through its "no surprises" clause, 247 the Miller Bill
seeks to ensure the continued existence of species. In furthering
this goal, the Miller Bill directs the Secretary to place a time
limit on incidental takings permits. 248 As a result, permittees are
not given the power to continue to take species whenever they
wish. The time limits are a proactive measure that was included
because long-term permits and HCPs may significantly jeopardize
the existence of at-risk species. 49
Another way in which the Miller Bill strengthens the ESA is by
providing for stronger enforcement. Recognizing the importance
of keeping individual citizens involved in the enforcement pro-
cess, Rep. Miller provided for a greater number of ways in which
citizens could bring suit against violators of the Act.250 Currently,
HCPs and CCAs are enforceable only as contracts. 25 1 Thus,' if
such agreements are broken, the guilty party can be charged
with breach of contract, but not with violating the ESA.252 How-
ever, the Miller Bill gives private citizens the ability to bring suit
against parties who violate any agreement made under the Act.25 3
In such cases, the defendants would be tried for violating the
ESA. Additionally, it abolishes time limits on bringing suits
246. Id.
247. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
248. "The Secretary shall limit the duration of a permit under this
paragraph as necessary to ensure that changes in circumstances that
could occur in the period and that would jeopardize the continued ex-
istence of the species are reasonably foreseeable." Id.
249. See Walley, supra note 203, at 8-9 (arguing that the unpredict-
ability of nature requires flexibility when attempting to conserve spe-
cies and that by disallowing additional mitigation and keeping HCPs in
place for a long period of time, the Kempthorne Bill ignores the
sound biological principals upon which recovery plans must be based).
250. H.R. 2351 § 109, 105th Cong. (1997).
251. See Section V.C. infra.
252. See Section V.B.2 supra.
253. The Bill states that citizens may bring suit against anyone "in
violation of this Act, any regulation or permit issued under this Act,
any statement provided by the secretary under section 7(b)(3), or any
agreement concluded under authority of this Act." H.R. 2351, 105th
Cong. § 109 (1997).
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against parties whose actions cause serious risk to a species.254
Finally, the Miller Bill creates tax incentives to encourage the
conservation of at-risk species and their habitat on private prop-
erty.255 In this sense, the Bill works to satisfy some of the desires
of private property rights advocates. Title II of the Bill gives the
Secretary the right to enter into "Endangered Species Conserva-
tion Agreements" with private landowners. The purpose of these
agreements is to enable the Secretary to protect species and
their habitats beyond the extent that the rest of the Bill
provides.256
To encourage landowners and lessees to enter into such agree-
ments, the Miller Bill provides tax incentives for these agree-
ments. More specifically, entering into an Endangered Species
Conservation Agreement reduces a property owner's taxable es-
tate by the value of the land the agreement covers.257 Addition-
ally, landowners gain a tax credit equal to any costs of complying
with an Endangered Species Conservation Agreement.2 8 Thus,
Miller uses the market to attain the politically determined goal
of protecting a public good.
Despite the widespread support that the Miller Bill has re-
ceived from environmental groups, 259 its prospects for passing are
254. See id.
255. See H.R. 2351, Title II, 105th Cong. (1997).
256. Title II gives the Secretary permission to create an agreement
that would require a private landowner or tenant,
(i) to carry out on real property owned or leased by the per-
son activities not otherwise required by law that contribute to
the conservation of a [listed or candidate] species ... ;
(ii) to refrain from carrying out on real property owned or
leased by the person otherwise lawful activities that would in-
hibit the conservation of a [listed or candidate] species ...
or
(iii) to do any combination of clauses (i) and (ii).
Id. § 201.
257. See id. § 202.
258. See id. § 204.
259. See Fialka, supra note 158, ("Individual environmentalists ...
applaud Sen. Kempthorne's revision [of the ESA], but most environ-
mental groups don't."); Carolyn Lochhead, New Proposal on Endangered
Species, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Sept. 4, 1997, at A5. "The Miller [Bill] is
backed by a federation of environmental groups called the Endangered
Species Coalition, including the Sierra Club, Defenders of Wildlife, the
Wilderness Society and others." See also, Sara Barth, Roadblocks to
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slim.216 The GOP's control of Congress greatly lessens the chance
that environmentally-friendly legislation will be passed. Pro-
property rights legislation, such as the Kempthorne Bill, will fare
much better. Moreover, the Miller Bill has yet to be passed by
the House Resources Committee, whereas Kempthorne's Bill has
cleared the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee.
261
Thus, of the two reauthorization Bills currently before Congress,
the Kempthorne Bill has a much greater chance of becoming
law.262
The situation is extremely unfortunate. The Miller Bill offers
stronger protection for endangered species than the
Kempthorne Bill. Where the Kempthorne Bill provides for rigid
HCP agreements, 263 the Miller Bill provides the flexibility re-
quired to adapt to changing circumstances. Additionally, the
Miller Bill gives the USFWS and NMFS more latitude in enforc-
ing conservation on both public and private land. The feeble
protection offered by the Kempthorne Bill will amount to no
protection at all, and in the end it will serve merely to deprive
the American people of a precious public good, biodiversity.
Reauthorization: The Latest Controversies in the ESA Debate, ENDANGERED SPE-
CIES UPDATE, Nov. 1997, at 8.
260. See John H. Cushman, The Endangered Species Act Gets a Make-
over, N.Y TIMES, June 2, 1998, at G2. ". . . Mr. Miller's Bill is very un-
likely to win approval this year, and the prospects for rewriting the law
before Congress adjourns for the November elections appear dim." See
also Lochhead, supra note 259, at A5 (stating that Miller's Bill has little
chance of surviving).
261. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
262. But see Fialka, supra note 158. The author quotes Rep. Rich-
ard Pombo (D-CA), who states, "If there is a bill out of the Senate,
there will definitely be one out of the House." Because the Miller Bill
is the only ESA reauthorization bill currently before the House, the
Senate's passing the Kempthorne Bill may actually prompt the House
to either pass the Miller Bill or to include many of its provisions in a
compromise bill.
However, as the 1998 Congressional elections near, the odds of
striking a bipartisan compromise grow increasingly slim. See Platt, supra
note 216, at 3 (stating that the need "to draw clear distinctions be-
tween the [Democrat and Republican] parties during the election sea-
son" undermined the prospects of passing bipartisan ESA legislation in
1996).
263. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.,
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VII. SHARED SPHERES AND THE CURRENT REFORM
Are endangered species primarily private goods or public
goods? What shall be our primary guide to protecting endan-
gered species: market forces or the political expressions of collec-
tive responsibility? This Article has attempted to demonstrate
that endangered species, like children, are precious resources on
which a dollar value cannot be placed, and are more accurately
characterized as public goods than private goods. Because of this
characterization, their well being, and consequently the well be-
ing of society, can best be assured through a primary reliance on
the political process. Once we have made a commitment to ap-
proach the protection of endangered species from the perspec-
tive of primary reliance on the political process, we must com-
pare the two proposals for reauthorization from that perspective.
This task is made slightly more difficult by the fact that the
Kempthorne Bill and the Miller Bill are similar in many re-
gards. 264 Both seek to expand the number of checks and bal-
ances on the listing and delisting of endangered species. Such
changes amount to increasing the size of the "ESA bureaucracy."
While many people fear such growth, bureaucracies are not es-
sentially bad. Rather, a bureaucracy ought to be judged by the
efficiency and quality of its functioning. In the case of the Bills
for ESA reauthorization, the bureaucracy created by the Miller
Bill would be much more effective than the one created by the
Kempthorne Bill.
One difference between the two Bills is the Kempthorne Bill's
efforts to include the states in the decision-making process.
Under the Kempthorne Bill, the Secretary would have to consult
with state agencies anytime he wished to change the status of a
species. 265 Additionally, the Kempthorne Bill requires the Secre-
tary to hold hearings in up to five states that would be affected
by a proposed recovery plan.266 The Miller Bill lacks such provi-
sions. While one might initially think that Kempthorne provides
more public involvement, and therefore is more reflective of em-
264. See Beth Baker, Washington Watch: Endangered Species Legislation,
47 BIOSCIENCE 733 (1997) ("At first glance, the two Bills seem similar.")
265. S. 1180 § 2, 105th Cong. (1997).
266. S. 1180 § 3, 105th Cong. (1997).
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phasizing collective responsibility, the reality is quite different.
Prior to these hearings, a scientific determination of the need to
protect the species would have already been made. What these
hearings would in essence do is to provide an opportunity for
those with an economic interest in keeping the species from be-
ing listed to voice their individual concerns and to delay the
time it would take to protect the species.
Both Bills require the listing of critical habitat concurrently
with the implementation of recovery plans. However, the Miller
Bill ensures the protection of species' habitats in the period be-
tween listing and adoption of recovery plans by providing for in-
terim habitat. In addition to failing to provide for interim
habitat, the Kempthorne Bill weakens the institution of critical
habitat by giving the Secretary the power to exclude land from
being listed as critical habitat at his discretion.267 Again, this pro-
vision would allow the Secretary to place individual economic in-
terests over the collective interest of preserving species.
Both Bills also place a deadline on the development and im-
plementation of these recovery plans. 268 However, the Miller Bill
deletes the ESA's provision that allowed the Secretary to avoid
adopting recovery plans, while the Kempthorne Bill leaves this
provision intact. By failing to omit such a provision while impos-
ing time limits on the adoption of recovery plans and adding to
the list of requirements of recovery plans, the Kempthorne Bill
may very well encourage the Secretary to fail to adopt recovery
plans. If the Secretary decides to do so, he may also be able to
dodge the requirement of designating critical habitat because
the temporal restraint on critical habitat designation is linked
with the adoption of recovery plans.
Both the Miller Bill and the Kempthorne Bill require pro-
posed recovery plans to include specific information about the
plan's scope and its effects on the species.269 However, the infor-
mation required by the Miller Bill is more specific than that re-
quired by the Kempthorne Bill. For example, the Miller Bill re-
267. S. 1180, 105th Cong. (1997).
268. See H.R. 2351 § 105, 105th Cong. (1997) (Miller Bill); S. 1180
§ 3, 105th Cong., (1997) (Kempthorne Bill).
269. Id.
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quires that recovery plans indicate which actions will violate the
ESA's prohibitions of illegal takings by both federal agencies and
private entities. 2 0 This requirement provides for proactive en-
forcement. If people know ahead of time which acts will be con-
sidered a violation of the ESA, they will be less likely to engage
in such acts.
Additionally, the Kempthorne Bill weakens recovery plans by
requiring the Secretary to prioritize proposed plans that mini-
mize conflicts with private property. Such a requirement under-
mines the goal of recovery plans (ensuring the recovery of im-
periled species). In contrast, the Miller Bill retains the ESA's
focus on recovering imperiled species by retaining the mandate
that the Secretary prioritize recovery plans that will best assist the
recovery of endangered and threatened species. On the other
hand, the Kempthorne Bill's vagueness may encourage violation
of the spirit of the law by those seeking to further private
interests.
Major differences between the two Bills affect the extent to
which each Bill would protect and foster the recovery of endan-
gered and threatened species. The Miller Bill, in addition to of-
fering better protection of habitat and better recovery plans,
would make it more difficult for the Secretary to issue incidental
takings permits. When such permits are issued, -the Miller Bill
would require that their purpose be in harmony with the goal of
helping the species to recover, and that the permittee report to
the Secretary on the status of listed species on her property an-
nually.27' The Miller Bill also strengthens the ESA's protection of
listed species by strengthening its enforcement.
While the Miller Bill emphasizes the goal of recovery and en-
hances the protection given to endangered and threatened spe-
.cies, the Kempthorne Bill emphasizes the goal of finding balance
(which frequently means catering to the interests of property
rights advocates) and weakens the ESA's protection of at-risk spe-
cies. The "no surprises" clause would freeze HCP agreements,
even if they failed to promote recovery. Safe harbor agreements
would enable property owners to take listed species on their
270. S. 1180 § 3, 105th Cong. (1997).
271. H.R. 2351 § 106, 105th Cong. (1997).
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property. Additionally, the Kempthorne Bill would weaken the
authority of the Secretary by delegating to the agencies the au-
thority to determine whether their actions are harmful to listed
species.
A final important difference between the Bills is the extent to
which they compensate landowners with listed species on their
property. While the Kempthorne Bill requires the compensation
of private entities that perform what the Act requires of them
(such as implementing recovery plans), the Miller Bill compen-
sates landowners only when they go above and beyond what is le-
gally required of them. Thus, Miller is again using the market to
preserve a public good.
When we ask ourselves how this choice translates into choos-
ing an appropriate mechanism for reauthorizing the Endangered
Species, the Miller Bill is the answer. Its focus is on preserving a
public good - endangered species - and while it recognizes a
role for markets, the Miller Bill never, unlike the Kempthorne
Bill, allows 'private market considerations to interfere with attain-
ment of that goal.
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